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FOREWORD
The military response to Hurricane Sandy was
historically significant. For the first time, dual status
commanders—military commanders authorized by
law to serve in both state and federal status simultaneously—were activated in an effort to unify state and
federal efforts under a single command structure during an unplanned response. The events that occurred
over the 2-week response period provide a basis for
lessons learned as we look to improve upon this first
attempt to use this unique command construct in
response to an unplanned incident.
In this monograph, Mr. Ryan Burke and Dr. Sue
McNeil discuss the results of their year-long case
study examining the military response to Hurricane
Sandy under the dual status commander arrangement. In one of the most thorough and comprehensive
analyses of the subject to date, Burke and McNeil first
address the chronology of the storm and the ensuing
military actions. They then assess both the successes
and shortfalls with the storm response. The authors
conclude the monograph with a detailed discussion of
15 recommendations, which have the potential to significantly improve future dual status commander-led
civil support operations.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
U.S. military forces have played a role in supporting civil authorities in varying locations and capacities from the Whiskey Rebellion to Hurricane Sandy.
In a large-scale incident response scenario requiring
combined support from the National Guard and federal military, effective management and coordination
continues to challenge all involved. There are issues of
constitutionality, legality, policy, financial considerations, and even politics, all uniquely situated between
individual states’ interests and those of the Federal
Government. In this context, there is a philosophical conflict between federalism and state sovereignty
during military civil support missions that continues
to present itself as an impediment to success. Balancing these institutionally divergent approaches to
achieve a unified, efficient, coordinated, and effective
military response has, and will continue to be, a strategic and political imperative. Despite the challenges,
military forces are frequently involved in domestic
response missions, often in a very public manner. As
such, military force allocation and management have
evolved into major topics of conversation among
policymakers, academics, emergency managers, and
military strategists alike.
Owing to these issues, State and Federal Government lawmakers adopted policy and law authorizing
a single military commander, referred to as a dual
status commander, to legally assume simultaneous
but mutually exclusive command and control over
both Title 32 and Title 10 forces during domestic operations. As a proposed solution to the notable coordination challenges plaguing domestic civil support
operations, the dual status commander initiative has
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been used successfully during planned events since
2004. The coordinated military response to Hurricane
Sandy in the fall of 2012 was the first time in U.S. history dual status commanders assumed command of
both Title 10 and Title 32 forces during a no-notice/
limited-notice incident. As such, this event provides a
relevant and timely opportunity to study the military
response to the storm and offer objective recommendations for improving future no-notice/limited-notice
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations
under the dual status commander arrangement.
The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to
offer an objective and systematic documentation and
evaluation of the military response to Hurricane Sandy
as a basis for assessing the efficacy of the dual status
commander arrangement for no-notice/limited-notice incidents in the homeland. To complete this effort,
we employed a rigorous case study investigation emphasizing the combined state and federal response to
Hurricane Sandy in the New York City metropolitan
area from October 22-November 15, 2012. The research
examines the events of the storm response under the
command of Brigadier General Michael Swezey, the
designated dual status commander for the storm response in New York. We combined interviews with
Department of Defense officials, National Guard commanders, and Active Duty military officers involved
in the Sandy response with extensive document and
content analysis of various Sandy-specific reports to
generate our findings. Through this research, we intend to present a detailed and objective analysis of the
response in order to provide military and defense officials with a greater understanding of the benefits and
limitations of the dual status commander arrangement during a no-notice/limited-notice civil support

xii

incident. We conclude by offering a series of recommendations likely to improve policy, procedures, and
training, among other things.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With often-unparalleled emergency response capabilities and capacities, the U.S. military is an extraordinary asset capable of providing immediate
assistance to civil authorities to “save lives, prevent
human suffering, and mitigate great property damage within the United States.”1 The strategic rebalancing of defense priorities away from counterterrorism
and insurgency operations and back to the homeland
will see the U.S. military continue to play an important role in domestic civil support and crisis response
operations. As such, it is imperative that we continue
to learn from past events like Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Sandy and strive for continuous improvement of our military’s domestic response capabilities.
Hurricane Sandy was the largest and most damaging Atlantic hurricane on record and the second
most costly in U.S. history, eclipsed only by Hurricane
Katrina.2 At the peak of the October-November 2012
military response to Hurricane Sandy in New York,
more than 4,000 National Guard personnel, along
with Active and Reserve Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
and Marines were engaged in supporting civil authorities as part of Joint Task Force Sandy. Most of our
substantive post-Sandy knowledge is found in various Department of Defense (DoD) after-action reports
and lessons learned publications.3 Beyond DoD publications and a small body of news reports, there is a
dearth of knowledge to date specifically analyzing the
DoD response to Hurricane Sandy available for public
consumption. Further, this particular defense support
of civil authorities (DSCA) event marked the historic
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first-time use of a dual status commander to command
both Title 10 and Title 32 force components in support
of a no-notice/limited-notice4 incident. Owing to the
newness of the concept and because it had not been
used in an actual disaster before Sandy, our findings
show a range of perspectives among DoD and state
personnel: some advocating for and supporting the
concept, others noting the concept’s limitations and
challenges. Regardless of position, it is clear that the
dual status commander arrangement has several benefits and limitations when applied to a no-notice/
limited-notice DSCA response environment. Our
study analyzes the dual status commander-led DSCA
response to Hurricane Sandy in New York. Through
this lens, the study illustrates and discusses the perspectives of the dual status commander construct and
offers recommendations for leveraging existing capabilities and improving those deemed insufficient.
STUDY CONTEXT
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy came ashore
along one of the most densely populated regions in
the country. Even though Sandy was downgraded to
tropical storm status prior to landfall, it was a massive
storm that affected east coast cities from Washington,
DC, to New York City. As was the case with Katrina,
the storm’s magnitude overwhelmed state and local
responders. Requests for military support were widespread, resulting in an over-convergence of military
forces inside the region within days of the storm’s
arrival. Again, like Katrina, National Guard forces in
both State Active Duty and Title 32 status operated
alongside Title 10 federal forces in support of civil
authorities responding to the storm’s damage. Unlike
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Katrina, however, this DSCA response effort was a
historical first for the U.S. military. For the first time,
National Guard and federal military forces executed
unplanned civil support operations under the tactical
command of dual status commanders.
In addition to being the first no-notice/limitednotice operation to combine Title 32 and Title 10 forces under the command of a single dual status commander, a daunting endeavor in its own right, several
additional factors further complicated the Hurricane
Sandy response effort. While the storm made landfall
nearly 100 miles south of New York City, the leading
northern edge of the storm, widely held as the strongest part of any hurricane, directly impacted New York
City, its surrounding boroughs, and parts of northern
New Jersey. This ultimately resulted in a multistate
incident spread across a large area of some of the most
densely populated counties in the United States. But
perhaps the most significant complication, as it turns
out, was the storm’s unprecedented timing. The 2012
presidential election was set to take place nearly a
week to the day, following the storm’s landfall. As we
have seen with past disasters and emergencies, such
events can serve as a serious political setback, or as an
opportunity to exercise leadership in a way that builds
political support for elected State and Federal Government executives. The unique political landscape
at the time of the storm presented yet another challenge for the military response that would ultimately
generate significant influence on the actual conduct of
response operations.

3

RESEARCH METHODS AND STUDY OUTLINE
This monograph presents the findings of our case
study. It combines personal interviews with extensive document analysis to form the substance of the
report and final recommendations. We were fortunate
to interview several high-ranking civilian and military officials with practical and relevant knowledge
of both the evolving dual status commander conversation and the Hurricane Sandy response effort in
New York. In addition to reviewing over 1,000 pages
of material relevant to dual status commanders and
Hurricane Sandy, we conducted 20 individual interviews and two focus groups with civilian and military
personnel representing the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the National Guard, and federal armed forces.
Our research represents a broad range of perspectives within State and Federal Government and offers
one of the most comprehensive and detailed studies
on Hurricane Sandy and the dual status commander
construct to date.
Before describing the operation and presenting our
findings, we offer a brief discussion of the history and
evolution of the dual status commander concept. In
this context, we discuss the relevant laws and constitutional authorities governing the use of military forces in a domestic environment, to include a review of
the tenets of federalism and state sovereignty. We also
describe the recent legislative chronology of the dual
status commander initiative and its eventual adoption
into federal law. After discussing the legal history and
framework of the dual status commander concept, we
offer a brief chronological description of the Hurricane Sandy response in New York State. We separate
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the response timeline into five sections (Shaping and
Anticipation, Initial Response, Continued Operations,
Stabilizing Operations, and Transition Operations),
each describing a period of time ranging from 3-7 days.
Using the description of events as a basis for further
discussion, we then provide an analysis of the notable
successes and areas of improvement based on our research. Finally, we conclude the monograph with a
detailed discussion of 15 policy and strategy-specific
recommendations intended for senior DoD leadership consideration. In summary, the monograph is
structured as follows:
• Evolution of the Dual Status Commander
— Legal Framework
— Federalism and Sovereignty
— Origin of the Dual Status Commander
Legislation
• The Military Response to Hurricane Sandy
— Shaping and Anticipation
— Initial Response
— Continued Operations
— Stabilizing Operations
— Transition Operations
• Post-Event Lessons Learned
— Successes
— Shortfalls
• Recommendations for Improvement
— Operational and Strategic
Recommendations
— Policy Recommendations
• Conclusion
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3025.18: Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, September 21, 2012, p. 4.
2. Eric S. Blake, Todd B. Kimberlain, Robert J. Berg, John P.
Cangialosi, and John L. Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane
Sandy (AL182012), Miami, FL: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, National Hurricane Center, 2013, p. 1, available
from www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.
3. DoD generated more than 10 after-action reports specifically addressing the response to Hurricane Sandy. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense, United States Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), the U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Warfare Development Command, Joint Task Force Sandy, Joint Task Force-Civil
Support, and others developed and published individual reports
made available to the author for assistance with this research.
4. “No-notice/limited-notice” is the DoD accepted vernacular
referring to incidents other than planned events of national significance (i.e., national security special events such as the Super
Bowl, political conventions, etc.). According to DoD personnel,
the no-notice/limited notice designation can often apply to Hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, terrorism, etc. Currently, there
is no doctrinal distinction between no-notice and limited-notice.
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CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF THE DUAL STATUS
COMMANDER
While military assets can provide a valuable service during civil support operations, establishing a
unified effort between Title 10 and Title 32 forces has
proven to be problematic in past civil support efforts.
The dual status commander (DSC) concept offers a
command arrangement legally authorizing one military officer to assume simultaneous but mutually exclusive command authority over both National Guard
forces under State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status
and Title 10 federal military forces. According to draft
DoD Instruction 3025.xx, “Dual-Status Commanders for Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” a dual
status commander is:
A military commander who may, in accordance with
the law, serve in two statuses, Federal and State, simultaneously while performing the duties of those
statuses separately and distinctly.1

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines
dual status commanders as:
Military officers who serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command for state and
federal forces—have authority over both National
Guard forces under state control and active duty forces under federal control during a civil support incident or special event.2

More simply stated: a DSC is “responsible for performing two separate and distinct but related jobs
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with two separate and distinct teams for two separate
and distinct bosses, all at the same time.”3 The need
for such a unique command architecture stems from
the various constitutional and legal considerations
governing the use of military forces in a domestic capacity, the root of which is our federalist system of
government. The process used for designating a DSC
is shown in Appendix I.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Federalism implies a system of shared powers between individual states and the national government.
These powers, as related to command and control of
military forces, are defined in the U.S. Constitution
and establish the legal authorities and limitations for
the employment of the military in domestic operations. Figure 2-1 shows the relevant sections and their
relationship to each other. The figure also serves as a
reference for the subsequent discussion.
In addition to authorizing Congress to “raise and
support Armies,”4 the Constitution also states:
Congress shall have the power. . . . To provide for calling forth the militia to execute Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to
the states respectively, the appointment of the officers,
and the authority of training the militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress.5
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Figure 2-1. Domestic Military Law Authorities and
their Relationships.
While these authorizations ensure states’ rights to
maintain a militia, or what is now the National Guard,
the language also ensures individual states’ rights are
subordinate to the power of Congress under certain
conditions. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution upholds this authority by stating:
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several states, when called into the actual service of
the United States.6
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The federalist construct and its associated law, as
applied to domestic military force operations, is intended to provide the legal mechanism for enabling a
unified military response under the order of the President during incidents of national significance requiring a combined response from the National Guard
and the Armed Forces. However, as we have seen in
past operations, most notably in Hurricane Katrina,
the Federal Government’s constitutional authorities
conflict with the perceived rights and responsibilities of the individual states and territories. The issue
of federal control versus state sovereignty presents
a significant point of friction between the States and
the Federal Government that continues to challenge
the effective command and control of the military,
most notably with regard to the National Guard and
the various duty statuses under which it serves during domestic operations. Moreover, the actual extent
of emergency powers and the range of discretionary authority state governors can exercise under the
10th Amendment of the Constitution is not a wellsettled area of law or public policy that needs further
examination.7
National Guard forces, unlike the Active and Reserve components of the federal armed forces, can
serve in three different duty statuses during a domestic operation. When activated in SAD status, the
National Guard serves under the command of the
state governor through the Adjutant General (TAG),
receives state pay and benefits, and is not subjected
to the restrictions of Posse Comitatus;8 that is, they
can engage in law enforcement activities when directed. When supporting operations undertaken at
the request of the President or Secretary of Defense
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(SECDEF), the National Guard serves under the authority of 32 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 502f; or in
Title 32 status.9 Unlike SAD, a Title 32 designation
must be requested by the governor and approved by
the President. Once approved, Title 32 status entitles
National Guard forces to receive federal pay and benefits while remaining under command and control of
the state governor. This is advantageous for operations spanning multiple states, as it eliminates the disparity in state pay rates and ensures state governors
command integrity of their National Guard forces.
Title 10 U.S.C. pertains to the laws regulating the
Armed Forces. In accordance with the language of the
Constitution, Title 10 provides the legal authority for
the President to “call into actual service”10 elements
of the National Guard for federal duty. This ability to
federalize state National Guard forces sets the legal
precedent for the President to assume full authority
over the militia.11 While the National Guard can serve
under Title 10 status, this authority is used almost
exclusively in support of overseas operations. Table
2-1 summarizes the authorities and responsibility for
different aspects of the National Guard under various
duty statuses (SAD, Title 32, and Title 10).
Duty Status
Command Authority
Pay and Benefits
Posse Comitatus Act

State Active Duty
Title 32
Governor
State
Federal
N/A

Title 10
President
Yes

Table 2-1. National Guard Duty Statuses.
In contrast, all Active and Reserve components of
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are con-
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sidered federal military forces and serve under Title
10 authority. Title 10 forces, as they are referred to
during civil support scenarios, receive federal pay and
benefits, and are subjected to the restrictions of Posse
Comitatus. These duty status distinctions are financially and legally necessary to distinguish the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities between the states,
Federal Government, and their respective military assets during domestic operations. The previous discussion also serves as the basis for the development of the
dual status commander construct.
FEDERALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY
The interpretation of authority and legality concerning the command and control of military forces
in the homeland continues to create tensions between
states and the Federal Government. The conflict between state power and federal authority introduces
confusion during response operations involving both
the Armed Forces and National Guard. Without clearly established chains of command, lines of authority,
and mission tasks, achieving unity of effort has proven difficult in past operations of large magnitude.12
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-28, Civil Support Operations, articulates the command complexities between
the Armed Forces and the National Guard conducting
simultaneous domestic operations:
There is not a chain of command in the military sense
between the President and the Governors. The President as head of the federal government and military
commander in chief may only exercise the authorities
granted in the Constitution and U.S. law. Within their
respective states, the Governors retain executive authority, to include command over their state’s national
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guard (Air and Army), until such time as the President mobilizes it for federal service. This is unique to
this operational environment, and commanders at all
levels need to understand the impact it has on the conduct of operations.13

As a result of the several duty statuses the National
Guard can occupy during domestic response missions,
combined with the possibility of integration with federal military assets, there are currently four command
and control models for consideration when coordinating a combined state and federal response effort (see
Table 2-2). As the table shows, the four models represent unique command arrangements, each of which
offers advantages and disadvantages depending on
one’s perspective.
Command Option

National Guard

Armed Forces

State*

Governor

Parallel

Governor

Dual Status

Dual Status Commander (32 U.S.C. § 315/325)

Federal

President

President

* = Conceptual model. While such a model has been proposed in
past legislation, currently, there is no legal basis for the governor of a state to assume direct command authority over federal
military forces.

Table 2-2. Domestic Military Command Options.
A unified and effective response is a desired end
state of civil support operations involving military
assistance. However, the constitutional impediments
discussed earlier fuel the noted tension between states
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and the Federal Government during domestic response missions. Therefore, the previously discussed
dual status model, wherein a single military officer
commands both state and federal forces simultaneously, was created in an attempt to address some of
the noted concerns.
ORIGIN OF THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER
LEGISLATION
Through the 2004 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA),14 Congress passed legislation allowing
a National Guard officer to hold temporarily both a
state and federal commission simultaneously, or serve
in a “dual status.”15 Since the 2004 enactment, DSCs
have been authorized to command 23 events of national significance, most notably events designated as
National Security Special Events.16 DSCs commanded
operations in support of national political conventions, summits, and sporting events integrating Title
10 and Title 32 forces under a single commander utilizing separate chains of command. These were preplanned events with extensive preparation prior to
execution. As such, many viewed these DSC-led operations as a success. In contrast, no-notice/limitednotice incidents like hurricanes, earthquakes, and
wildfires are less certain and can lead to significant coordination challenges, such as those observed during
Hurricane Katrina.
The U.S. military’s response to Hurricane Katrina
was widely criticized for coordination failures between state and federal levels, procedural inefficiencies, force allocation redundancy in some places and
gaps in others, administrative and legal failures, and
overall response timeliness.17 In the years following
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the divided military response to Katrina, state governors and DoD officials realized the urgent need for
policy changes and the requirement for an improved
coordination mechanism between State Government,
Federal Government, National Guard forces, and federal military forces. Realizing the legal precedent in
place under 32 U.S.C. § 315 and 325 (a)(2),18 a new series of conversations developed in an effort to simplify the orders process, reduce force redundancy, and
close the operational gaps within the DSCA environment, all while simultaneously addressing the noted
tension between state sovereignty and federalism, the
legality and constitutionality of using military forces
for domestic response, and the financial barriers present when combining the National Guard and Armed
Forces. (See Figure 2-2.) This began a lengthy debate
over legislation outlining how military forces would
operate in future domestic operations.

Figure 2-2. Dual Status Commander
Influence Diagram.

15

Between 2006 and 2010, annual NDAAs contained
legislation that outlined changes to the authority and
control of Title 10 and Title 32 forces operating in support of no-notice/limited-notice incidents. Following
repeated failed attempts between state and federal
leadership to legislate a mutually agreeable command
and control mechanism for emergency and disaster response, the DoD and a previously appointed Council
of Governors came to an agreement on the use of dual
status commanders during such events.19 In 2010, the
Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort was
signed and agreed upon by the DoD and the Council
of Governors representing state interests.
The Joint Action Plan effectively established the
guidance authorizing a DSC, in a simultaneous but
mutually exclusive manner, to command both National Guard and federal armed forces during incident response scenarios. The goal of this agreement
was to establish a common operating picture between
State and Federal Governments regarding the employment of military forces in response to domestic
emergencies or disaster. As noted by the plan, the
DSC arrangement offers alternative command architecture to the traditionally divided parallel model
and provides, conceptually at least, a mechanism in
which state sovereignty and federal interests can be
equally balanced.20 With the Joint Action Plan signed
and agreed upon in early-2011, DSCs were authorized
to command the DSCA response for both Hurricanes
Irene and Isaac in 2011. However, DSCs were either
not activated for these events or did not receive both
Title 10 and Title 32 forces for the operations.21 Nonetheless, these events provided a valuable opportunity
for governors and DoD officials to test the DSC activation process and further endorse its concept. With
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the notable success of past negotiations and the noted
potential of the command concept following Irene and
Isaac, legislators included the DSC concept in the 2012
NDAA, which codified the DSC construct into law as
the default command arrangement during incident response scenarios and specified the DSC as the “usual
and customary command and control arrangement,
including for missions involving a major disaster
or emergency.”22 Less than 10 months after the 2012
NDAA was signed into law, Hurricane Sandy became
the first time a dual status commander received Title
10 and Title 32 forces to execute unplanned civil support operations. Therefore, it is imperative that we
take this opportunity to learn from the event and improve our future domestic response capabilities under
the DSC arrangement. The following sections discuss
the events of Hurricane Sandy in New York, with emphasis on the challenges faced under the DSC arrangement and some of the notable issues associated with
the historic response.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE SANDY
The following sections offer a brief chronological
description of the events of Hurricane Sandy under
Joint Task Force (JTF) Sandy in New York from October 22 to November 15, 2012. This discussion is limited
to the events surrounding the dual status commander
(DSC) arrangement and any associated circumstances
or considerations. To provide context, the discussion
begins with a review of the unique geo-political environment in the New York metropolitan area. The
events are then grouped into five similarly named
categories representing a defined date range:
1. Shaping and Anticipation: October 22-29.
2. Initial Response: October 30-November 2.
3. Continued Operations: November 3-5.
4. Stabilizing Operations: November 6-9.
5. Transition Operations: November 10-15.
These categories align with existing Department
of Defense (DoD) reference publications detailing
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) response
phases. Also, to provide context, Figure 3-1 provides
maps of the study area and snapshots of the military
presence in three periods: October 30-November 2;
November 3-5; and November 6-9. The placement of
unit symbols within the counties (circles for National
Guard and pentagons for federal military) is not representative of their actual locations during the response.
If military activities occurred in a particular county
during the defined date ranges, we placed a single
unit graphic near the center of the county to illustrate
a force presence. Force strength numbers for federal
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forces involved in the Sandy response were either inconsistent or unavailable, so we did not scale the unit
graphics for federal forces. Consistent National Guard
force strength estimates, however, were available to
us via daily DoD press briefings detailing the ongoing storm response. The circles representing National
Guard forces are scaled in size according to the average daily force strength estimates provided for the
New York metropolitan area:
•	October 30-November 2: approximately 2,300
Guardsmen;
•	
November 3-5: approximately 3,200 Guardsmen;
•	
November 6-9: approximately 4,100 Guardsmen.

Figure 3-1. Military Activities During
Hurricane Sandy.
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The activities are summarized in the timeline shown
in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Hurricane Sandy: Timeline
of Significant Events.
NEW YORK’S UNIQUE GEO-POLITICAL
LANDSCAPE
Hurricane Sandy’s near-direct hit on the most
populated city in the United States1 and the financial center of our economy less than 1 week prior to
a presidential election was unprecedented, a coincidence noted by multiple interviewees.2 In addition to
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the timing of the storm’s landfall, the ensuing state
and federal response was largely influenced by the region’s unique geo-political structure. Given this fact, it
is important to understand the organizational context
of the response by discussing some of the complexities
within the system of government in and around New
York City.
New York is a “home rule” State. Therefore, local municipalities below the state level can, with
some restrictions, create and enact laws, and govern
themselves as they see fit without state legislature approval. As a city municipality, New York City is no
exception to this rule. Where New York City differs
is in the unique structure of its governmental leadership within its five boroughs (Manhattan, Brooklyn,
Queens, Bronx, and Staten Island). Each of the five
boroughs, all of which maintain separate county distinctions (New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx, and Richmond Counties, respectively), is represented by a borough president rather than a county seat. The borough
presidents are elected officials and interact directly
with the mayor of New York City, who serves as the
representative of all five counties. In addition, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey operates each
of the airports, bridges, maritime ports, and ground
transportation terminals in the New York City metropolitan area, including property in New Jersey. The
complexities of the transportation network and commuting patterns within the New York metropolitan
area, coupled with the diversity of its local commerce,
further complicate city management functions.
Adding to the confusion is the influence of and
interactions with the counties surrounding New York
City’s boroughs to the north (Essex, West Chester, and
Rockland) and on Long Island to the east (Nassau and
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Suffolk). This layered bureaucracy creates complexity
in the simplest of government activities and is often
influenced by state versus local politics and, in some
cases, personality conflicts. Beyond this, state and federal politics do not function the way a military command structure functions. Whereas the military uses
an extensive hierarchical system of command delineation, civilian leaders operate under local and state
jurisdictions. Therefore, the governor cannot dictate
orders to city mayors just as the President cannot
dictate orders to a state governor. Coordinating a regional response effort incorporating town, borough,
county, state, and federal entities across a divided
geo-political landscape can prove a daunting task.
As suggested by multiple interviewees, the timing of
Sandy’s landfall prior to the upcoming presidential
election, combined with New York City’s unique geopolitical environment, may have prompted more aggressive involvement by the Federal Government and
had a significant influence on the conduct of the joint
state and federal military response activities.3
Shaping and Anticipation (October 22-29).
The 2012 Atlantic hurricane season was a particularly active one, with 19 named storms, 10 of which
became hurricanes.4 On October 22, 2012, the 18th
tropical depression of the season formed over the
southwestern Caribbean Sea and quickly strengthened into Tropical Storm Sandy late that day. On October 24, less than 2 days after its initial formation,
Tropical Storm Sandy was upgraded to Hurricane
Sandy near Kingston, Jamaica.5 A day later, on October 25, Hurricane Sandy’s projected path had become
more apparent. As a result, the Federal Government,
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led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), began coordinating with several states in the
mid-Atlantic region likely to be impacted by Sandy in
the coming days. With the growing likelihood of a significant event unfolding, DoD, through the Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), issued deployment preparation orders for pending DSCA operations on October 27.6 Shortly thereafter, NORTHCOM deployed
multiple defense coordinating officers (DCOs)7 to
FEMA Regions 1 (New England), 2 (Northeast), and
3 (mid-Atlantic) to assist in future DoD resource coordination efforts. While DoD coordinated its preparations, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Virginia each
activated National Guard troops in their states. Over
a period of 6 days, states and the Federal Government went from routine operations to a heightened
state of alert in preparation for the arrival of this
historic storm.
As the storm approached the coast on October
28, President Barack Obama signed Stafford Act
emergency declarations for Connecticut; Washington, DC; Maryland; Massachusetts; New Jersey; and
New York. Over the next 24 hours, Hurricane Sandy
weakened from a category 1 hurricane to a tropical storm. The storm made landfall slightly north of
Atlantic City near Brigantine, NJ, at approximately
11:30 p.m. on October 29, 2012.8 That same day,
President Obama signed additional disaster declarations for Delaware, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania;
and declared major disaster areas in New Jersey and
New York following massive storm surges along
each coast. With the new disaster declarations approved, the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a standing
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execution order directing NORTHCOM to provide
direct support to FEMA in the affected states.9 This
would set the stage for the unprecedented combined
state and federal military response under the DSC
arrangement.
Owing to the Joint Action Plan and 2012 NDAA,
state governors had the option to request a dual status commander for the pending DSCA response. Ultimately, six states received authorization to employ a
DSC: New York, New Jersey, Maryland, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Of the six
states receiving DSC authorizations, only two—New
York and New Jersey—actually activated a DSC to
lead the military response efforts.10 While the military
response in New Jersey under Brigadier General Bud
Grant did receive both Title 10 and Title 32 forces, this
response effort was neither as geographically or politically complex as the New York response, nor did
it experience the challenges noted in the DSC-led response in New York. For these reasons, the DSC-led
response in New York under JTF Sandy, commanded
by Brigadier General Michael Swezey, is the primary
focus of this case study.
Initial Response (October 30-November 2).
As this was the first ever use of DSCs during a nonotice/limited-notice incident combining state and
federal response forces, Hurricane Sandy was, undeniably, an event of national and historic significance.
In addition to the significance of the military response,
Sandy also led to the first 2-day closure of the New
York Stock Exchange since 1888.11 The storm also precipitated only the second mandatory evacuation ever
issued for low-lying parts of New York City. In total,
375,000 people were ordered to evacuate prior to the
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storm.12 Post-storm assessments suggest that over
305,000 homes were destroyed in New York, most of
which were located along major coastlines and subjected to storm surge.13 The storm surge also flooded
an estimated 2,700 homes and businesses in the city14
and rendered more than 2,000 homes on Long Island
uninhabitable.15 The storm disrupted power to more
than 1.5 million New York City residents and killed
43 people statewide.16 In total, New York experienced
an estimated $19 billion dollars in damages, including
$5 billion for the transportation system alone.17 The
storm had a profound effect on the New York metropolitan area that ultimately led to a large military
response. The events that followed during the 2-week
military response to the storm provide us with several
relevant topics to consider as we attempt to improve
future dual status commander-led DSCA response
efforts.
In the first days following Hurricane Sandy’s landfall, the DoD took a proactive, if not aggressive, forward-leaning approach in its response efforts. In anticipation of the need for military support, Governor
Andrew Cuomo requested a DSC through the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and America’s Security Affairs (HD/ASA).
Following this request and routing through the various approving authorities,18 the decision was made
to establish a dual status commander-led JTF in New
York to coordinate the military response within the
state. In addition, members of Joint Task Force-Civil
Support, commanded by Major General Jeff Mathis,
deployed to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
(JBMDL) in New Jersey to coordinate the multistate response effort as part of the joint coordinating element
(JCE). As the commanding general of this detachment,
Mathis served as the JCE to the joint force land compo30

nent commander (JFLCC), Lieutenant General James
Caldwell, of U.S. Army North (ARNORTH). In his
capacity as the JFLCC JCE, Mathis coordinated Title
10 activities between the DSCs in New York and New
Jersey and ARNORTH. As the ARNORTH commanding general, Caldwell reported directly to General
Charles Jacoby, Commanding General of NORTHCOM, who subsequently reported to the Secretary
of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ultimately to the President. On the state side, Swezey,
the appointed DSC, reported to Major General Patrick
Murphy, the Adjutant General (TAG) for New York.
As the New York TAG, Murphy reported directly to
Governor Cuomo and represented the state’s military
decisionmaking authority (Figure 3-3).

Command and Coordination

Figure 3-3. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure.
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Within 2 days of Hurricane Sandy making landfall
in Brigantine, NJ, the command structure had been established, and military assets from around the United
States deployed to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst,
NJ. An amphibious ready group (ARG) comprised
of three U.S. Navy ships (USS Wasp, USS Carter Hall,
USS San Antonio) sortied from Norfolk Naval Station
toward the New York Harbor as part of routine hurricane avoidance maneuvers. The USS Wasp was the
first to arrive and was anchored off the New York City
coast on November 1. A reduced force contingent of
the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) would arrive aboard the USS Wasp shortly thereafter. The USS
San Antonio and USS Carter Hall arrived a day later on
November 2.
Meanwhile, personnel from the Office of the Secretary of Defense were engaged in administrative
oversight of the response while the Defense Logistics
Agency, with the help of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), began sourcing and transporting supplies to affected areas. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE), as the lead federal agency for National Response Framework (NRF) Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3, Public Works and Engineering,
was also heavily involved in the early stages of the
response. Further, NORTHCOM, the National Guard
Bureau, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other missioncritical DoD entities actively coordinated with FEMA,
as well as state and local authorities throughout the
mid-Atlantic region in an effort to get ahead of the
storm response and provide support. This “go big, go
early, go fast” approach19 employed by DoD during
the response to Hurricane Sandy ultimately would
influence the remainder of the operation and provide several opportunities for lessons learned toward
improving such complex operations in the future.
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Additionally, the national significance of the storm
on the financial center of the U.S. economy less than
a week before the 2012 presidential election prompted an increased sense of urgency from the Federal
Government.
We’re not going to tolerate any red tape. We’re not going to tolerate any bureaucracy.
		
		

President Barack Obama,
October 31, 201220

In hierarchical organizations, public statements
from senior leaders and executives can greatly influence the actions of subordinates, regardless of whether
such statements comply with organizational policies.
In these “policy-by-speech” moments, such comments
can be interpreted as standing guidance for future actions. President Barack Obama’s comment after Sandy’s landfall is no exception. In this case, red tape and
bureaucracy can be found in national disaster guidance documents such as the NRF and National Incident Management System (NIMS). When the President publicly states that red tape and bureaucracy will
not be tolerated, such guidance tends to be ignored
or circumvented in order to make things happen in
the most expeditious manner possible. The administration’s encouragement to abandon established strategies and policies during the conduct of a domestic
military response is problematic. Operational strategies guide tactical decisionmaking and are designed
to accomplish a given mission in accordance with the
rule of law. DoD conducts military operations in accordance with clearly established strategies and associated tactics. The military needs to know its mission, but it also needs to know the rules. Encouraging
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noncompliance leads to messy, chaotic, and inefficient
operations.
In some cases, this is precisely what we saw during
the military response in New York. The NRF, NIMS,
and other such guiding documents and processes
are not law. However, departing from the traditional
forms of instruction tends to create additional problems as orders and missions begin to fall outside of
established guidelines for conducting domestic response. In essence, these policy-by-speech moments,
well-intentioned as they may be, sometimes serve the
opposite intent and introduce greater confusion and/
or challenges in the response.
While this is not an indictment of the President,
it is also not an endorsement of the NRF and its associated guidance. National disaster response guidance is robust and detailed. Following such guidance
can often be counterproductive during disasters and
emergencies. However, federal disaster response is
complex, so there is a reason for such formal guidance.
Aggressive, mission-oriented decisionmaking by military commanders stimulated by the White House and
reaffirmed by senior DoD leadership can accelerate
the sometimes mechanistic response process, often
leading to more effective deployment and support
operations. However, this accelerated disregard for
policies, procedures, and (in some cases) laws sometimes comes at the expense of unity of effort, sacrificing the principal focus for any combined state-federal
response under the DSC construct.
Despite the challenges noted, military commanders and the National Guard successfully navigated the
geo-political landscape of New York City. In the early
stages of the military response in New York, National
Guard troops conducted operations in Manhattan,
and as well as Nassau, Kings, and Suffolk Counties.
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New York-based National Guard units established
supply points of distribution, executed search and
rescue missions, assisted in resident evacuations,
and supported local law enforcement by conducting
security and presence patrols in areas affected by the
storm.21 In addition to coordinating the myriad initial
response efforts spread across Manhattan and several
surrounding counties and boroughs, personnel assigned to JTF Sandy were busy setting up an operational command center and establishing a routine for
the coming days’ efforts. By most accounts, the first
days of the JTF Sandy response were largely effective
and free of any noteworthy challenges.
As the days passed, effects of the storm compounded. Three days into the combined state and federal response, power outages still plagued areas within the
five boroughs; flooding from the recent storm surge
continued to hamper restoration and recovery efforts;
and fuel shortages led to increasing lines at area gas
stations. As a result of this, the likely influence of
expanding media coverage of the storm’s impacts in
and around New York City, and the President’s “no
red tape” speech, new guidance was issued from
DoD leadership to begin integrating federal military
forces into the response effort. This guidance, according to sources knowledgeable on the matter,22 was relayed from the highest levels of DoD to NORTHCOM
commanders down to the tactically focused Title 10
commanders, specifically directing them to:
• Get missions;
• Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork;
•	
Apply total force capabilities to accomplish
missions;
•	
When you get a mission: execute. Clean up
paperwork later.23
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This external pressure to integrate Title 10 force activity into the Sandy response, despite a lack of formal
requests by New York authorities at the time, would
contribute to some of the most significant activities
during the entire storm response days later.
Continued Operations (November 3-5).
Nearly a week after Sandy’s initial landfall, the
storm’s effects were becoming more apparent. Despite
a range of ongoing response activities throughout the
metropolitan area, there were still unmet needs noted
by local officials and first responders.24 As news media coverage grew, it contributed to the external pressures faced by the JTF Sandy staff to expand military
response activities by involving prepositioned federal
forces. The events of November 3-5 are among the
most notable and regularly debated of the 2-week
response operation.
November 3.
By November 3, National Guard forces operating in New York under Swezey were performing a
range of missions in four of the five New York City
boroughs, as well as four additional counties north of
the city and on Long Island. While the National Guard
force in New York had demonstrated its ability to meet
initial requirements, there was no way to accurately
predict future requirements and needed capabilities.
With several Title 10 assets pre-staged at JBMDL and
pressure to integrate federal forces mounting, the
DSC found himself in a unique position that required
balancing political influence, operational requirements, financial considerations, and legal nuances to

36

determine the most efficient and effective manner to
respond to a growing need.
On the morning of November 3, flooding from
Sandy’s storm surge continued to present significant
challenges for storm responders. In addition, there
were widespread fuel shortages due to the ongoing
power outages. With 4 days remaining before the
election, national news media coverage regularly
broadcast footage of lengthy lines of those waiting for
gasoline at area stations.25 That morning, the White
House, without consent of the states, issued an executive order for the Defense Logistics Agency to begin
transport and distribution of fuel in both New York
and New Jersey.26 As a result of this new order and the
increasing external pressure to involve Title 10 forces,
Swezey considered deploying a contingent of Active
Duty forces to assist in dewatering operations in area
subways as well as increasing fuel distribution in the
surrounding boroughs.27 Prior to requesting Title 10
force support and becoming the first DSC to assume
command and control of Title 10 and Title 32 forces
for a no-notice/limited-notice incident, Swezey had to
weigh several considerations, not the least of which
were the politics influencing the response.
According to doctrine, Title 10 forces should only
be considered during domestic response when local
and state capacities have been overwhelmed or when
civil authorities are otherwise incapable of performing the necessary mission28—in this case, pumping
thousands of gallons of water out of subways and other flooded facilities and distributing fuel via military
transport. Largely due to costs associated with using
Title 10 assets, as well as the infringement on state sovereignty, federal forces, at least doctrinally, operate on
a “last in, first out” philosophy in these situations. As
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a result, there is redundancy built into the state emergency response process. One form of redundancy regularly used during disaster response is the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Under
EMAC, can request additional support (such as National Guard forces) from surrounding states to assist
in incident response operations within their state.29
In order for the DSC to request support from Title
10 forces, standing state-to-state EMAC agreements
should be fully implemented. However, it is often left
to the governor’s subjective assessment to determine
the point at which EMAC agreements are no longer
an option, and DSCA is a requirement. Therefore, it
is difficult to clearly define the appropriate trigger
for requesting DSCA. This can be problematic for
several reasons.
According to some, requesting Title 10 force support prior to exhausting all EMAC options carries
strategic implications for the National Guard.30 If,
instead of using an EMAC to request additional National Guard troops, Title 10 forces deploy to support
state operations, the resulting public perception of the
National Guard may be one of ineptitude. Such perceptions can strain the relationships between the DSC
(who is most often a National Guard officer) and TAG
(also a National Guard officer and appointed by the
governor in most states). While these are political and
policy issues, they can and do influence the conduct of
DSCA operations. As we saw during Sandy, the DSC
had to balance the political desires of elected officials
with the necessity of mission accomplishment. As a
commander with two distinct chains of command,
the DSC must balance both state and federal responsibilities in a way that facilitates efficient and effective
tactical leadership.
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With the political implications aside, EMAC requests for additional National Guard forces carry
other logical considerations. Since National Guard
personnel are civilians first, many have jobs outside
of their role in the Guard. To justify a request for activating more Guard personnel, there must be missions
to fulfill. Otherwise, activating civilian Guardsmen to
wait idly by not only interrupts occupational continuity, but is also a waste of taxpayer money. During the
early response to Sandy, the DSC knew he had Title
10 forces at JBMDL ready to support the response operation if requested. With the experiences of Katrina
in mind, no one at the state or federal level wanted
to be late to respond or be short on resources. Owing to these issues and in addition to the state of operations on the morning of November 3, Swezey, with
the support of both state and federal chains of command, made the decision to deploy Title 10 forces to
assist in dewatering operations in New York City. At
11:28 a.m. on November 3, 2012, Swezey became the
first dual status commander in U.S. history to assume
tactical control of Title 10 forces during a no-notice/
limited-notice DSCA response.31 On this day, a joint
force of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
personnel assigned to the 19th Engineer Battalion in
Fort Knox, KY, deployed to the area as part of Task
Force (TF) Pump and began dewatering operations
under the command of the DSC and JTF Sandy.
November 4.
Less than a day removed from the successful coordination and first-time deployment of Title 10 forces
under a DSC-led no-notice/limited-notice DSCA response, the dual status commander was unaware of a
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Title 10 force operation ashore on Staten Island. By the
evening briefing, what was a successfully coordinated
operation experienced its first and perhaps most significant coordination challenge of the entire Sandy
response effort.
The events of November 4 have been addressed in
numerous after-action reports and post-Sandy analyses of the DSCA response. According to these sources,
Swezey was made aware of the fact that U.S. Marines
assigned to the 26th MEU and aboard the USS Wasp
off the coast of Breezy Point, NY, came ashore on Staten Island in order to support local authorities. What
we do not know is exactly how the Marines were
requested to support civil authorities or who generated the request. While the circumstances leading to
the Marine Corps’ arrival on Staten Island remain in
question, one thing is certain: the DSC did not request
Title 10 forces to come ashore on November 4, nor was
he aware of the Marines’ activities until long after they
arrived. The events of this day provide perhaps the
single most valuable example of confusion and, consequently, opportunities for lessons learned from the
entire Sandy response.
Upon learning of the Marines’ landing on Staten
Island, the DSC contacted his state and federal chain
of command to inquire about the mission request and
authorization, or lack thereof. According to sources
knowledgeable on the situation, none of the general
officers within the state or federal chains of command
were aware of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) mission
on Staten Island or knew who authorized the landing.32 Fearing the perceived violation of state sovereignty as a result of a federal military force operating
ashore without the governor’s request or approval,
the DSC requested that the Marines on Staten Island
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cease all operations and return to the ship. Since neither the DSC nor the governor formally requested
the Marines’ assistance, nor were any of the military
commanders aware of the circumstances leading to
the Marines’ activities, it was thought at the time that
this would set a bad precedent for future DSC-led
DSCA response efforts. Unless justified under Immediate Response Authority per DoD Directive 3025.18,
some suggested that an unauthorized Title 10 operation would question the efficacy of the newly agreed
upon DSC architecture for no-notice/limited-notice
response scenarios. Due to the concerns voiced by
members of JTF Sandy, NORTHCOM issued guidance on the evening of November 4 to halt all Title
10 activities outside of the DSC’s awareness.33 While
some voiced their concerns over the Title 10 presence
on Staten Island, others praised the decision to bring
Marines ashore. Regardless of position, the next challenge for the DSC was determining how and why the
Marines were requested to come ashore and then,
since they were ashore and capable of assisting, determining how to best use their force capability to help
the citizens of New York.
November 5.
With operations continuing overnight and into
the morning of November 5, the Marine Corps presence on Staten Island remained a primary focus of the
DSC and other senior leaders. Other than operating
under Immediate Response Authority (IRA) in accordance with DoD Directive 3025.18, there is a lengthy
and often arduous request process governing how
Title 10 forces receive and fill mission assignments to
support civil authorities. Given the questionable cir-
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cumstances of the Marines’ arrival—particularly if not
justified under IRA—it seems that the request for assistance (RFA) process was not followed. Despite this,
the Marines were still ashore and actively involved in
debris clearance and other assistance activities. After
discussing options with TAG and the JFLCC, the generals determined that the DSC would assume tactical
control of the Marine detachment operating on Staten
Island. As the Title 10 JCE to the JFLCC, Mathis specified when the Marines were aboard the USS Wasp,
they would be under tactical control of the joint force
maritime component commander. However, in order
to alleviate further confusion, the Marines would operate under the tactical control of the DSC anytime they
were ashore. The JFLCC further clarified that all Title
10 forces ashore in New York must have approval and
awareness of the DSC moving forward or must be performing functions under ESF 3 and in direct support
of the USACE.
After clarifying these issues and assuming tactical
control of the Marines in his area of operations, the
DSC issued instructive guidance to the detachment
authorizing them to perform debris clearance only—
not debris removal, due to important Stafford Act and
associated legal distinctions between the two terms.34
Local residents welcomed the Marine Corps presence on Staten Island while local and national media
outlets provided extensive coverage of the response
activities. What started as a significant complication
seemingly undermining the authority of both the governor and the DSC evolved into a mutually supportive
and beneficial operation between the Title 10 forces
and the DSC-led JTF.
Beyond the scope of the USMC activities on Staten
Island, the remaining operations on November 5, con-
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sisted mainly of dewatering missions under TF Pump
in the Rockaways and Manhattan. These missions
continued into the evening of November 5 with visibility and approval of the DSC. At the conclusion of
the day on November 5, the DSC-led DSCA response
in New York under JTF Sandy now had a full contingent of both state National Guard and federal military
forces operating throughout. Many of the previously
encountered challenges had been resolved, or at least
stabilized. The impacts of the military response effort were becoming tangible as time progressed further from initial landfall. The DSCA operation moved
into the stability operations phase of the response
with a positive outlook for the remaining stability
and transition.
Stabilizing Operations (November 6-9).
November 6.
On the morning of November 6, the National
Weather Service issued nor’easter warnings for a large
area in the northeastern United States, including New
York City. While both the USS San Antonio and USS
Carter Hall vacated the area to avoid the coming storm,
the USS Wasp chose to remain at anchor off the coast of
the city. With a small detachment of Sailors assisting
in dewatering missions on Liberty Island and Marines
from the 26th MEU still supporting debris clearance
on Staten Island, the ship’s captain chose to weather
the storm off the Breezy Point coast. With the Navy
ships moving out, dewatering operations in support
of TF Pump continued across the region under the
tactical control of the DSC. Meanwhile, outside of the
DSC chain of command, FEMA, the Defense Logistics
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Agency, the USACE, and US TRANSCOM continued
supporting response operations in affected areas in
New York and New Jersey.35 As the storm closed in on
the New York City area, NORTHCOM officials issued
guidance to all Title 10 forces supporting the response
to prepare for retrograde after the storm passed. The
next 2 days would see minimal changes in activity as
the storm approached.
November 7.
As the nor’easter approached on November 7, Title
10 and Title 32 forces continued supporting civil authorities in a variety of capacities. According to the
DoD’s daily Pentagon briefing on November 7, Marine Corps engineers assigned to TF Pump assisted
in dewatering operations in Queens, Air Force teams
operated in support of the New York City Fire Department in the Rockaways and Brooklyn, and Navy
dive teams assisted in pumping missions at the World
Trade Center.36 The DoD also reported that Marines
continued to assist with debris clearance on Staten Island and pumping operations in Breezy Point alongside Navy personnel.37
November 8.
November 8 consisted of much of the same from
the previous day’s work. While the nor’easter had not
completely cleared the region and continued to limit
flight operations, military forces maintained their
support of local authorities in dewatering missions
throughout Manhattan and the surrounding boroughs. Again, according to DoD reports on November 8, elements of the Army Reserve’s 401st quarter-

44

team supported pumping operations on Long Beach
Island and Staten Island. Interviews with Sandy
commanders revealed that the Army Reserve unit
on Staten Island was operating outside of the DSC’s
awareness and under Immediate Response Authority, according to their unit commander.38 As a result
of this and the expiration of the 72-hour time limit
granted under IRA, the Reserve unit was instructed to
vacate the area.
While minimal in comparison to the Marines’
so-called “invasion” of Staten Island, this was still a
noteworthy issue that offers support for the recommendations that follow. With regard to the Marines,
they continued their support to civil authorities by
dewatering homes and apartment buildings in Breezy
Point and the Rockaways. Airmen supported pumping missions at the Rockaway Waste Water Treatment
Facility while Navy divers maintained their support
of dewatering efforts at the World Trade Center.39
Army and Air National Guard personnel continued
their assistance through ongoing food and water distribution, fuel distribution, sheltering, debris removal,
and donations distribution.40 Operations continued
throughout the day and into the evening without any
notable incidents. By the evening of November 8, the
nor’easter had passed, making way for a new day of
unrestricted response efforts.
November 9.
By November 9, DSCA stability operations were
nearing an end. The storm had passed, and many of
the same activities from November 8 carried over into
operations the following day. In addition to ongoing
debris clearance and removal in Staten Island and
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the Rockaways, operations on November 9 included
Air Force support in the Rockaways and on Long Island, Army and Navy dive team support at the World
Trade Center, and Marine Corps and Navy pumping
missions in the Rockaways and Breezy Point.41
Transition Operations (November 10-15).
Operations from November 10-15 quickly reduced
in frequency and scope. By November 11, NORTHCOM had released a redeployment order for the ARG
to return to Norfolk.42 The next day, most of the 26th
MEU redeployed back to Camp Lejeune, NC. The majority of the Title 10 forces departed by November 13,
leaving mostly National Guard personnel in the area
of operations. Seemingly as fast as the operation began, it was nearing its conclusion. By the middle of
November, nearly 2 weeks after Sandy’s initial landfall, most of the region’s power was restored; well
over a million gallons of water had been pumped from
area homes, apartments, subways, and other facilities;
thousands of rations of food and water were distributed, and countless quantities of debris removed from
areas with damaged infrastructure. By many accounts,
the first ever use of a dual status commander-led nonotice/limited-notice DSCA response was nearing a
successful completion.
In total, it is impossible to say how many lives
were saved due to JTF Sandy’s actions during the 2
weeks following the storm. While lives saved cannot be measured, military actions during the storm
response contributed in significant ways to preventing suffering and mitigating further property damage
for the residents of New York and other surrounding
states. The DSC-led response under JTF Sandy in New
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York successfully integrated National Guard and federal armed forces for the first time in a no-notice/limited-notice incident. As with any first-time experience,
there were instances of success and challenge. As a test
case for future operations, this event provided several
examples of lessons learned, which can be used to improve future DSC missions in similar capacities. The
following section discusses some of the most pressing
lessons learned, including successes and perceived
failures, and analyzes the circumstances surrounding each occurrence. The lessons learned provide the
foundation for the final section of recommendations
based on the conclusions found in this research.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-EVENT LESSONS LEARNED
Hurricane Sandy caused a great deal of damage
in the New York metropolitan area. However, Sandy
was only a Category 1 storm when it made landfall
and quickly dissipated after coming ashore. While the
storm surge was one of the most significant in New
York’s history, the storm could have been worse. The
post-event lessons learned from this storm cover everything from conflicting command intent, command
and control, communication, coordination, mission
assignments, laws, policies, and even politics. Within
the observations of this analysis, there are examples of
successes that should be repeated, as well as examples
of issues needing improvement. This chapter is divided into two main categories: successes and shortfalls.
Within successes, there are four sub-categories and
associated discussions:
• Coordination;
• Liaison officers;
• Forward-leaning strategy;
• Sustaining successes.
Within shortfalls are six sub-categories and associated
discussions:
• Process Integrity;
• 
Title 10 Awareness of the Dual Status Commander Construct;
• Command Stucture;
• Mission Assignment Process;
• 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
Education;
• D
 ual Status Commander Guidance/
Instructions.
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SUCCESSES
Between extensive dewatering and supply transport and delivery, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
were critical to the ongoing success of the overall federal response. Despite the importance of these contributions to the operational successes, the dual status
commander (DSC) was not in a position to command
or direct USACE or DLA activities. Since these Department of Defense (DoD) activities occurred outside
of the DSC-led response in New York, they are not detailed in this analysis. This is not to say that the dual
status commander (DSC)-led joint task force (JTF) did
not succeed. Despite being the historic first-time use
of a DSC for a combined state and federal response,
there were some notable successes. Hurricane Sandy
provided a proof-of-concept environment for evaluating a DSC operation that involved effective coordination, the successful integration of liaison officers
(LNOs), and a strategic forward-leaning approach to
the operation, including pre-positioning Title 10 assets, all of which should be repeated and leveraged
again in future DSCA response operations of similar
circumstances and requirements.
Coordination.
While it cannot be empirically proven through systematic analysis, according to several accounts of the
response effort, the DSC JTF successfully coordinated
many complex staff integration processes that facilitated effective joint communication and coordination
between Title 10 and Title 32 staff representatives.1
During the beginning stages of establishing the tem-
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porary JTF, National Guard and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) staff officers transitioned into
the initial operations phase with minimal complication. Initial staffing procedures, including the identification and pre-deployment of defense coordinating
officers (DCOs) to the anticipated affected areas, were
executed with clarity and focus. The JTF established
the required staff cells and began coordinating the
response operation. These critical staff procedures, at
least in the early stages of the storm response, were
efficient and effective, and should be used as a guide
for future DSC-led JTF augmentation. Additionally,
the willingness of commanders and senior leaders to
use verbal orders of the commanding officer (VOCO)
as a basis for executing tasks and missions was also
an effective coordination mechanism noted during the
Sandy response.
With the noted complexities and burdensome
nature of the mission assignment process, leaders
encouraged their subordinates to obtain VOCO as a
basic form of approval prior to conducting response
activities. Commanders and other senior leaders demonstrated a willingness and ability to coordinate verbally and direct the tactical response activities without waiting for the often sluggish written approval
process to occur. In many cases, this led to quicker
response activities that ultimately benefitted the citizens of New York. One specific example of this VOCO
process occurred immediately following the Marine
Corps’ arrival on Staten Island on November 4.
Aside from the administrative coordination successes noted previously, one of the most significant
tactical coordination successes that can offer insight
into future command decisionmaking occurred when
the DSC received word of the Marines’ unsolicited
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(from the DSC JTF) landing on Staten Island. As mentioned earlier, following an initial period of frustration
over the landing and subsequent verbal coordination
with general officers within the chain of command,
the DSC was given tactical control of the Marine detachment ashore instead of having them return to the
ships. This decision provided two benefits: 1) the command authority of the DSC and ultimately the Governor of New York remained intact by assuming tactical
control of the unrequested force; and 2) it offered a
tried and accepted decision mechanism for future operations where DSCs can request tactical control of all
Title 10 forces entering the joint operations area (JOA)
regardless of pretext.
Conversely, had the Marines been permitted to continue operating ashore outside of the DSC command
architecture, the sovereignty of New York and the
governor’s authority, and thus the purpose of establishing a DSC as a principal coordination mechanism
between the states and Federal Government, would
have been undermined. In contrast, had the Marines
returned to the ship as was originally proposed, this
would simply serve to further the divide between the
State and Federal Government, ultimately to the detriment of the citizens of New York, further questioning
the efficacy of the DSC arrangement.
As it occurred, the DSC’s assumption of tactical
control over the Marines, to the satisfaction of both the
Title 10 and Title 32 commanders, resulted in a successful solution to what was one of the biggest points of
friction and areas for improvement of the entire DSCA
response to Hurricane Sandy. Assessing the dynamics of VOCO, including the level of compliance and
implementation, is nearly impossible from a lessons
learned perspective. However, the benefit of VOCO is
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evident from the Sandy response. Coordinating operational continuity by assuming tactical control of the
Marines occurred almost entirely through verbal discussion and coordination, thus reaffirming the value
of the VOCO process as a critical coordination practice. In many cases, VOCO coordination is facilitated
by and through strategically positioned LNOs inside
the relevant agencies, services, departments, and
organizations.
Liaison Officers.
Interservice/agency coordination is critical to the
success of any joint operation. It is perhaps even more
critical to the success of no-notice/limited-notice response, given the dynamic and evolving nature of
such operations. Since information and requirements
so often change during these events, generating and
maintaining situational awareness is a necessity for
commanders. As designated representatives of their
respective service or organization, LNOs and/or emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) provide a
vital function to any commander executing joint operations. The placement of LNOs across the entire JOA
was considered by many senior commanders to be one
of the most beneficial practices employed by the joint
force during Hurricane Sandy.2 By embedding LNOs
representing various services in and around important
staff elements, such as the joint field office (JFO), JTF
Headquarters, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), and the respective military service
headquarters, operational decisionmaking processes
were enhanced through shared situational awareness.
While there were some LNO coordination gaps
noted (discussed later in this monograph), the empha-
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sis on using LNOs to improve coordination is a success worth repeating. While it is unclear exactly how
many LNOs were essential to amplify command coordination during Sandy, it appears from the available
data that LNO integration provided an intangible but
genuine benefit. By identifying needs and assigning
LNOs to critical areas, the joint force demonstrated a
forward-leaning, assertive approach to this civil support operation that is also worth noting.
Forward-Leaning Strategy.
Exercising command initiative by deploying LNOs
throughout the JOA is an example of a successful,
forward-leaning approach employed by DoD and
the National Guard in response to Hurricane Sandy.
Rather than waiting to deploy forces until after receipt of a support request, both DoD and the National
Guard took a proactive approach and prepositioned
forces and equipment in and around areas affected by
Sandy. As discussed, the lessons of Hurricane Katrina
remain embedded in the minds of many. Given the
highly criticized federal response to Katrina, the prevailing philosophy of senior leaders involved with the
planning and execution of the Sandy response held
that DoD should take aggressive measures to ensure
that the citizens of New York and other affected states
receive the assistance they need when they need it. In
other words: “don’t be late.”3
DoD’s effort to avoid repeating the failures of
Katrina resulted in the aforementioned “go big, go
early, go fast” approach that involved prepositioning
equipment and forces and taking additional steps to
facilitate coordination and communication between
all participating units and agencies. Rather than op-
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erating via a pull philosophy, in which DoD waits for
requests from local and state agencies to mobilize resources, a push mentality was employed. This push
vs. pull approach is a paradigm shift of sorts for DoD
compared to past response efforts. Placing personnel
and equipment assets on standby status in geographic
proximity to the JOA offered the DSC additional capabilities to consider during the response, which
ultimately proved beneficial.
Although the prepositioned forces assume an associated cost risk if they are not used—and therefore
pressure commanders to employ mobilized assets—
the benefit of having prepositioned Title 10 forces near
the JOA as a force multiplying capability is significant.
Additionally, this option saves National Guard forces
from activating troops, forcing them to unnecessarily
leave their civilian jobs for extended periods in the
event they are not involved in the response operation.
In the case of Hurricane Sandy, prepositioned Title 10
forces gave the DSC the flexibility to maximize the National Guard assets currently in the JOA and prevented
the unnecessary mobilization of potentially thousands
of additional Guard troops at the additional expense
to the taxpayer. The Title 10 forces prepositioned in
and around the JOA provided an obvious benefit to
the DSC that should be considered an administrative
and strategic best practice for future civil support
scenarios.
Sustaining Successes.
While not a comprehensive list, the aforementioned information reveals some notable successes that
should be considered by those directing future operations. Sustaining the successes will provide some of
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the critical components of the strategic, operational,
and tactical level frameworks necessary to ensure a
successful DSCA response under a DSC-led JTF. To
ensure the continued use and implementation of those
actions for future operations, it is important to include
these successes in lessons learned and after-action
reports. DoD has a robust lessons learned program
within each service component. Often, reports generated by Centers for Lessons Learned provide DoD
with valuable information and recommendations to
incorporate into future training exercises, simulations,
and actual operations. Integrating these successes into
the ongoing lessons learned process would ensure
leaders have the information necessary for improved
decisionmaking during future DSCA events.
Leveraging lessons learned ensures commanders can incorporate valuable knowledge into critical
training and exercise simulations. These simulations
often provide military forces with the most comprehensive and realistic opportunities to train and prepare for likely operational situations. Integrating this
knowledge into future DSCA training events offers
commanders an opportunity to test and evaluate the
efficacy of the aforementioned strategies and tactics.
By simulating such operations, commanders are better positioned to execute actual operations when the
time comes. Further, training and simulations create
evaluation scenarios that help identify mission-critical gaps and areas for improvement, such as training
more LNOs to serve in this necessary function.
Finally, DoD and the National Guard can ensure
sustained successes in future DSCA operations by
training more personnel to serve as LNOs. The LNO
requirement is essential for a successfully coordinated
response, especially one involving multiple services,
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agencies, departments, and organizations. Maintaining a cadre of trained personnel capable of serving as
LNOs is necessary for continued success. With trained
LNOs involved in extensive exercises and simulations
designed in consideration of past lessons learned,
DoD and the National Guard can sustain the notable
successes from Hurricane Sandy and improve performance during the next no-notice/limited-notice incident requiring DSCA. However, beyond sustaining
the successes gleaned from Hurricane Sandy, there are
several areas for improvement to learn from as well.
SHORTFALLS
Despite some important successes, it is crucial to
note that temporary JTFs for no-notice/limited-notice
incidents are just that: temporary. These makeshift
commands stand up in response to events requiring
joint coordination of military activities in support of
civil authorities. They do not train for months in preparation for deployments, as defined military units often do. Due to this temporary joint structure, the JTF
often lacks continuity and sound working relationships. As a result, these operations inevitably experience challenges. While the preceding successes offer
valuable insight into sustaining future actions, there
are, as expected, numerous areas for improvement
worth noting.
The coordinated federal response to Hurricane
Sandy had many successes; and, as is to be expected
with the first-time implementation of a new command arrangement, the operation had many failures
from which to learn. The following section identifies
some of the more significant challenges the DSC-led
JTF and associated personnel experienced during the
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2-week response. For clarity and consistency, the topics are again separated into categories with a detailed
description of the circumstances for context and consideration. This section serves as the basis for the final
section of this monograph that details specific recommendations for improvement of strategy and policy.
Process Integrity.
As previously discussed, the preparation phase of
the Sandy response was efficient and largely effective.
In New York, civilian and military personnel deployed
to the planned JOA early and set up a functioning
JTF ready to coordinate the receipt and employment
of state and federal forces. From the storm’s landfall
on October 29 to the conclusion of initial area assessments on October 31, most accounts of the operation
were positive. National Guard forces were the main
military presence within the New York City boroughs
and on Long Island. Title 10 assets and personnel had
been prepositioned at nearby Joint Base McGuire-DixLakehurst (JBMDL), Trenton, NJ, and were awaiting
mission assignments. However, growing frustrations
over power outages, fuel shortages, and expanding
news media coverage of the response, likely coupled
with the pressures of the pending election, prompted
the Federal Government to begin taking a more assertive stance in the response effort. The administration’s October 31 “no red tape” guidance, coupled
with NORTHCOM’s November 2 fragmentary order
(FRAGO),4 while both certainly well-intentioned, contributed to some of the resulting confusion during
subsequent days.
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November 2 NORTHCOM FRAGO
•	Get missions. Start with menu of DoD capabilities in the JOA that can be applied to support
FEMA requirements.
•	Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork.
Coordinate with FEMA and the DCOs.
•	
Apply total force capabilities to accomplish
missions. Operate on VOCO mission assignments when possible.
•	When you get a mission: execute. Clean up paperwork later by coordinating with FEMA and
the DCO.5
Those instructions, copied from a written
FRAGO on November 2, seemingly encourages military commanders to abandon the structured processes
normally in place in favor of less restrictive, verbal
communication. In most cases, this demonstrates the
military’s ability to conduct flexible, adaptive, and in
some cases, improvised operations when bureaucracy
would simply be an unnecessary obstacle impeding
efficiency. On its own, this guidance is encouraging
and could be interpreted as consenting direction for
Title 10 forces to respond under Immediate Response
Authority. However flexible, it was in conflict with
the DSCA process taught to military officers as part of
their professional military education.
When guidance stems from the most senior levels,
it tends to move through the subordinate echelons
with greater urgency. As a result, actions often happen with more fervor and zeal. When such guidance
contradicts policy and legislation, however, it invites
violations of the same laws and procedures that are
designed to maintain order, structure, and accountability in the first place. In some ways, senior com-
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manders decided, essentially, to marginalize or ignore
many of the guiding documents and laws governing
military civil support operations. As a result, the National Response Framework (NRF), the mission assignment process, and other pertinent procedural
guidance that serve as a system of checks and balances
were largely ignored or abandoned by some senior
leaders. The most notable example of this issue was
the U.S. Marines landing on Staten Island without the
prior consent or knowledge of the DSC.
Title 10 Awareness of the Dual Status Commander
Construct.
Building on the earlier discussion detailing the
events of November 4 and 5, we know that the Marines’ arrival on Staten Island resulted from a series of
conversations outside of the established chain of command and perhaps without consideration for normal
Title 10 request for assistance procedures. A number
of after-action reports and personal interviews with
those knowledgeable of the events support the claim
that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, through
the II Marine Expeditionary Force commanding general directed the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
commander to deploy his unit to the USS Wasp off the
coast of New York. The guidance from the Commandant instructed the MEU to: “Get to New York City,
go ashore, do good, and relieve the suffering that is occurring.”6 These same reports and interviews suggest
that a New York/New Jersey Port Authority official
circumvented the normal processes and initiated the
request via direct communication with Headquarters
Marine Corps (HQMC). As a result, without a mission
assignment or notifying the DSC, Marines carried out
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their orders and began support efforts on November
4. Except for justifying the Marine Corps’ arrival on
Staten Island as Immediate Response Authority (discussed in subsequent sections), the legal basis for the
Marines’ activity on Staten Island on November 4 and 5
is, at best, questionable. Since the DSC was unaware of
the Marines’ activity until after their arrival, this offers
a valuable lesson learned to improve future Title 10 coordination with the DSC JTF. This failure of communication and coordination suggests several things worth
discussing.
Incursion, intrusion, invasion, initiative: all are
words that have been used to describe the Marines’
landing on Staten Island on November 4. Aside from
debating the semantic classification of the Marines’
presence on Staten Island, this event illustrates some
important points. Perhaps the most significant lesson
learned from this action is the lack of familiarity and
understanding of the DSC arrangement among some
Title 10 officers. Some officers who commanded units
during Sandy admitted to being completely unaware
of the DSC concept, structure, and command arrangement prior to execution.7 In addition, due to the pressure from the Commandant and the aforementioned
NORTHCOM guidance to “get missions,” the MEU
repeatedly contacted the joint coordinating element
at JBMDL, rather than the DSC JTF, to request mission assignments. This is problematic for two reasons.
By contacting the joint coordinating element (JCE)
and other senior commanders to request missions,
the MEU:
• d
 emonstrated that it did not have a clear understanding of the DSC chain of command and
was, in effect, excluding the DSC from the con-
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versation simply because it was unaware of the
DSC role.
•was, in effect, pressuring senior commanders
to involve a Title 10 force in the response effort
prior to the DSC JTF’s acknowledgement of the
requested need.
After some time without acknowledgement from
the JCE and following discussions with HQMC and
Port Authority personnel, the MEU debarked a small
detachment of Marines from the USS Wasp to assist
Staten Island authorities in debris removal and restoration activities (a mission not covered by an approved
mission assignment and without the awareness of the
New York DSC at the time). Despite occurring outside
of DSC’s scope, the Marines provided a requested
service in support of the residents and local authorities on Staten Island. As such, it became evident that
this activity should continue. Following a brief interruption in activity on the evening of November 4 (as
previously discussed), the Marines resumed support
activities under the tactical control of the DSC on
November 5.
The lessons learned here suggest several things.
First, when command guidance encourages the abandonment of policies, accountability and clarity are lost
in such a complex response environment. A long history of disaster research suggests that the “red tape”
of government bureaucracy hinders response processes, often to the detriment of the citizens of an effected
area.8 As taxing as it may be to adhere to response policies and procedures, combined state and federal response efforts require some semblance of structure to
function adequately. The Marines’ landing on Staten
Island suggests that not only do some military com-

66

manders lack the necessary education and knowledge
concerning the DSC construct, but there is also limited
understanding of the requirements and procedures
of the mission assignment process. Regardless of the
reason for abandoning procedures, this particular set
of circumstances suggests that military commanders
do not have a clear understanding of the dual status commander construct and its application during
no-notice/limited-notice DSCA response scenarios.
Moreover, between political influences, uncoordinated civilian activities, and occasional federal military
ventures under Immediate Response Authority, DSC
may not be able to command and control as much of
the response as we expect them to. These events also
suggest that the established command structure for
the Sandy response was unclear.
Command Structure.
Beyond the Marine activity on Staten Island, confusion and lack of clarity concerning the actual joint
command structure further complicated matters during the Sandy response. Because Sandy was a multistate incident, the decision was made to put a JCE
as an intermediary echelon between the Army North
commander (Lieutenant General William Caldwell)
and the New York DSC. In this case, Major General
Jeff Mathis, Commanding General of Joint Task ForceCivil Support served in this capacity as the JCE with
supervision of all Title 10 forces in both New York and
New Jersey during the Sandy response. In a single
state incident, this would be an unnecessary command position, as the DSC would report directly to the
Army North (ARNORTH) commander, to NORTHCOM, to the Secretary of Defense, and finally to the
President on the Title 10 side. In the Sandy response,
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however, the JCE served as an additional command
layer and added confusion to the already complex
command hierarchy.
According to some accounts in after-action reports
and personal interviews, the command structure
changed multiple times during the first days of the
operation. The role of the JCE was unclear to many, as
there are conflicting accounts among those who participated in the event. Some maintain that the JCE was
the intermediate link between the JFLCC (ARNORTH)
and the DSC with command authority linking the two
echelons (Figure 4-1). Others, however, dispute this,
suggesting that the JCE’s role was just that: a coordinating element with no command authority over the
DSC, as suggested in the alternative structure shown
in Figure 4-2.
While accounts differ, the fact remains that the
command and control structure of the Sandy response
was unclear to the Title 10 side. On more than one occasion, this lack of clarity resulted in the New York
DSC fielding calls on his cell phone or receiving emails
from Title 10 forces advocating for their capabilities
and requesting orders to assist in the response. In effect, the DSC received multiple unsolicited requests
from Title 10 forces petitioning for their inclusion in
the operation. This not only points to a lack of clarity
regarding the command structure, but also suggests
that Title 10 forces either deliberately ignored processes or were mostly ignorant to the coordination and
approval procedures involving the DCOs and their
counterparts in the JFO. Within this context, other
processes were equally challenging, leading to confusion during the Sandy response in New York.
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Figure 4-1. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure.
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Figure 4-2. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure,
Alternative View.
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Mission Assignment Process.
The DoD mission assignment process outlining the
procedures for Title 10 support of civil authorities is
unwieldy. Combining this cumbersome process with
the urgent needs following a no-notice/limited-notice
incident creates additional burdens for military and
civil authorities to manage. The unprecedented timing
of Hurricane Sandy just prior to a presidential election
and its near-direct hit on the most populated city in
the United States only increased the interagency pressure to provide timely response. For reasons previously mentioned, the mission assignment process was
not followed on several occasions during the federal
response to Sandy in New York. The lack of adherence to established procedures can be attributed to all
levels of command. Specifically, the Sandy response
in New York suggests needed improvement in the
mission assignment process as it relates to approval
and authorization, as well as speed and necessity of
assignment processing.
Within the mission assignment parameters, requests for DoD assistance are generated from local
and state authorities after all other resources (local,
county, state [including National Guard], and Emergency Management Assistance Compact) have been
exhausted or are otherwise unable to provide the
necessary service due to limited capabilities. (For example, dewatering the New York subways required
pumping capabilities beyond local and state capabilities). Conceptually, this bottom-up process ensures
that federal forces sourced for DSCA have a mission
to perform based on requests from local authorities. In
actuality, the mission assignment process sometimes
creates a bureaucratic obstacle for a commander that
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hinders operational response. When there are unmet
needs in a DSCA response scenario, bureaucracy creates frustrations and impatience, which can lead to
noncompliance with established procedures. During
Sandy, there were several instances of this as missions
came from the top-down and without requests from
state and/or local officials.
Without approved mission assignments but in
consonance with NORTHCOM guidance, military
units converged on the New York area in the days following Sandy’s landfall. Units deployed intending to
provide assistance without consideration for accounting procedures or Title 10 and Title 32 coordination
strategies. This force surge created a cluttered JOA
with some units in the area without the knowledge of
the DSC. This also led to the inundation of unsolicited
offers of support from Title 10 forces, which had to be
fielded by members of the JTF staff, further complicating an already complex coordination effort. In some
instances—and likely due to the sluggish mission assignment approval process—missions were generated
and disseminated from the top-down, rather than
bottom-up, per the NRF guidelines. Eventually, Title
10 forces began conducting support activities without
a mission assignment or knowledge of the DSC. As a
result, key personnel in the JTF staff, the New York
State Office of Emergency Management, including the
state coordinating officer (SCO), and other critical coordination elements, were excluded from the conversation. This led to increased confusion and reduced
interagency coordination. With Title 10 forces operating in the DCS’s tactical area of control and responsibility and without a valid mission assignment, the
immediate reaction in some instances was to order
all nonapproved activities halted until approval was
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granted. As a resource employer, the DSC is responsible for coordinating federal and state efforts simultaneously. Mission assignment protocol should not
restrict the DSC from employing state and/or federal
resources appropriately to meet a need. The impediments that prevent a DSC from approving missions
within his/her area of responsibility, especially Title
10 missions providing needed support to local authorities, hence, should be removed.
To many, the published mission assignment process is mechanistic and convoluted. Some argue that
the heavily bureaucratic process creates delays and
inefficiencies at a time when speed and effectiveness
are most critical. Therefore, the fact that DoD did not
adhere to the mission assignment process during
the Sandy response may be perceived by many as a
progressive step forward. However, abandoning the
mission assignment process entirely creates significant impediments to coordinating and executing an
operationally, legally, and financially sound federal
response. With increased confusion resulting from ad
hoc processes outside of the established guidelines,
this ultimately diminishes the unity of effort desired
in DSC-led DSCA responses.
As with other topics discussed, the Sandy response in New York illustrated some of the current
issues plaguing the process and offers a useful case
study platform to generate improvement. Based on
this event, it is clear that the mission assignment process can be improved to ensure this situation does not
occur again in future DSCA missions. During a nonotice/limited-notice incident, the first 72-96 hours
of the federal response are absolutely critical and can
mean the difference between a manageable disaster
and one where Congress, the media, and the public
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collectively blame DoD for sluggishness. A better
and more streamlined mission assignment process
is needed to recognize this critical response period.
However, improving the mission assignment process
is only one step in the larger DSCA context. As the
response to Sandy demonstrated, some military commanders and other senior defense officials lack the
requisite knowledge of the DSCA environment and
the newly established DSC construct. We must ensure
that senior military commanders and defense officials
are fully educated in the DSCA arena, with specific
emphasis on the DSC arrangement.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities Education.
Of the noted areas needing improvement, perhaps
none is more important than DSCA education for senior military leaders. While there are many subject
matter experts in all things related to defense support
of civil authorities, there appears to be a critical gap in
DSCA knowledge among some senior military commanders. As evidenced by the failure to follow mission assignment processes and the notable confusion
over the role and authority of the DSC, it appears that
some senior leaders, often with decisionmaking authority, lack the required knowledge to ensure their
decisions fall within established legal, financial, and
doctrinal barriers of DSCA operations. The critical
triad of DSCA considerations—the legal, financial,
and doctrinal guidelines—were abused during the
Sandy response in New York, in many cases due to
a lack of DSCA knowledge among commanders and
their support staffs. This is not to suggest that all Title
10 DSCA operations were in violation of policies and
procedures; much to the contrary, in fact. The prob-
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lems that occurred during the Sandy response in most
cases can be attributed largely to lack of formal education, training, and knowledge of the DSCA response
environment.
As noted previously, some Title 10 force commanders were unaware of the DSC arrangement prior
to their involvement in Sandy. The same reports and
interviews suggest that USACE commanders were
equally unfamiliar with the DSC construct. In this
case, Title 10 forces attached to Task Force Pump and
in support of the USACE as the lead federal agency
for Emergency Support Function-3 were assigned
missions beyond the scope of any pre-approved mission assignments for Title 10 forces. Reports suggest
that USACE personnel were unaware of certain Title
10 restrictions for federal military forces and did not
have an effective process in place to facilitate coordination with the DSC. While these issues were resolved
through effective interservice liaison efforts, they
point to larger issues that must be addressed.
If unit commanders supporting DSCA operations
are unaware of the command structure in place, this
can certainly contribute to increased confusion and
uncertainty, much like what occurred during Sandy.
The DSC construct is relatively new and had never
been used during a no-notice/limited-notice DSCA
response prior to Sandy, so there is some expectation
of unfamiliarity. However, the lack of knowledge toward the DSC arrangement on behalf of some commanders during the execution of a real-world DSCA
operation is troubling. This suggests that we need to
improve knowledge and awareness of senior military
officers with DSCA-related mission capabilities organic to their units. It also suggests that we need to
significantly improve our communication and infor-

74

mation sharing prior to and during DSCA operations
so that commanders supporting civil authorities can
operate within the established command configuration, limit future confusion, and therefore, contribute
to the desired unity of effort that the DSC arrangement
is designed to facilitate. Finally, this suggests an urgent need for more realistic training and exercises like
Vigilant Guard, Ardent Sentry, and others designed
to simulate a DSCA response under a dual status
commander.
Dual Status Commander Guidance/Instructions.
Much of the confusion and lack of situational
awareness concerning the DSC initiative can be attributed to the lack of formal guidance currently contained in DoD reference publications, doctrine, and
instructions. Currently, the DoD Instruction 3025.xx,
“Dual Status Commanders for Defense Support of
Civil Authorities,” is in draft status, with a tentative
fall 2014 release. As a subordinate publication to the
more widely circulated DoD Directive 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities,”9 DOD Instruction
3025.xx will address many of the current issues of confusion concerning dual status commander-led DSCA
operations. Until the release of this new instruction,
few other defense references offer guidance on the
dual status commander construct, and even fewer contain any substantive information that can be applied
to no-notice/limited-notice incidents.10 There is a critical need within DoD and the National Guard to codify
DSC guidance through the development and continued revisions of relevant guidance, doctrine, and reference publications. Such work is ongoing within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM, and
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the individual services. However, until DoD develops
and releases clear, well-articulated guidance detailing
the many issues relevant to the DSC construct, these
operations will continue to experience challenges like
those noted.
While not a comprehensive list, this chapter offers
a brief description of some notable areas recognized
through the Hurricane Sandy operations as needing
improvement during dual status commander-led
DSCA operations. Using this as a basis for future decisionmaking and planning efforts can lead to improvements in these critical mission capabilities under the
unique command arrangement noted.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers that
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3. “Don’t be late” was a repeated axiom describing DoD’s
strategic planning approach to the Sandy response. This was noted in multiple after-action reports and in the context of the lessons
learned from Hurricane Katrina.
4. “Fragmentary Order” is defined by Joint Publication (JP)
1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Military Terms,
as “An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed
after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.” JP 1-02, Washington, DC:
DoD, 2014, p. 105.
5. Copied material from NORTHCOM guidance (fragmentary order) of November 2.
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addressing the DSC construct in any capacity.
10. The only DoD publication devoted to the DSC construct
at this time is NORTHCOM Publication (NP) 3-20, Title 10 Support
to Dual Status Command Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating
Procedures. Released in January 2012, this document outlines the
employment procedures and considerations for the use of DSCs
during civil support missions. However, this document pre-dates
Hurricane Sandy by nearly a year. Lessons learned from Sandy
are beginning to trickle in and have led to the need to rewrite
this publication. According to NORTHCOM personnel, NP 3-20
is undergoing significant revisions at this time. JP 3-28 was published in July 2013 following significant revisions from the 2007
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version. JP 3-28 offers some of the most comprehensive text regarding DSC of all DoD publications reviewed. This new version
“introduces, defines and clarifies the dual-status commander to
include nomination, training and appointment requirements” (p.
iii). Additionally, JP 3-28 includes a useful process diagram (Figure 13) to depict the DSC designation process once requested by
state governors (2013, p. C-9). U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-28,
Civil Support Operations provides a detailed description of the DSC
concept and construct. This reference defines the authorities and
requirements for establishing DSC arrangements and provides
useful graphics to illustrate the operational and tactical command
relationships between the DSC, State Governments, and the Federal Government (p. 7-5). However, defined guidance on the execution process for no-notice/limited-notice incidents is absent in
this reference. Other pertinent military reference publications, including Army Doctrinal Publication 3-28 and Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) 3-28, address the DSC concept
briefly without providing any substantive guidance for the execution of complex no-notice/limited notice DSCA operations such
as Hurricane Sandy.
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CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Building on the previously stated issues and the
preceding analysis of the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) response to Hurricane Sandy, this
final chapter of the monograph outlines a detailed series of strategy and policy-related recommendations
specific to no-notice/limited-notice DSCA responses
under a dual status commander (DSC)-led joint task
force (JTF). The following recommended actions and
measures are intended for senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders to consider to improve potential
DSC improve the DSC construct and related concepts
within defense support of civil authorities operations.
The suggestions are based on an extensive analytical coding process that identified recurring themes in
the source data (interviews, after-action reports, etc.).
After coding and interpreting the material to identify
viable recommendations, we again coded the material into two distinct categories using an axial coding
approach. The recommendations are grouped into
two categories: 1) operational and strategy-specific,
and 2) policy-specific. A brief narrative description or
justification accompanies each recommendation. The
material offers a condensed summary of the most
advocated recommendations from throughout DoD.
The recommendations are intended to be actionable
and realistic; although some, if implemented, require
significant changes or alterations to existing policies,
procedures, or doctrine, and may, therefore, be judged
impractical by some.
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OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC
RECOMMENDATIONS
Lean, But Don’t Push Forward.
The forward-leaning approach employed by DoD
prior to and during the Sandy response was effective.
Prepositioning Title 10 forces at nearby bases and offshore, issuing prepare-to-deploy orders, and deploying defense coordinating officers to anticipated disaster areas is necessary to facilitate a timely response
upon request from civil authorities. Cost issues aside,
moving Title 10 forces into the joint operations area
(JOA) provides the DSC with abundant force capabilities ready to meet nearly every contingency.
Some officers who participated in Sandy suggested
that prepositioning Title 10 forces was the preferred
strategy, rather than activating National Guard troops
through Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC) and other sourcing mechanisms.1 Aggressive
posturing of Title 10 forces in and around a disaster
area offers quick response and unmatched capabilities. However, DoD and the service components must
avoid being too forceful while ensuring compliance
with laws, policies, and procedures.
Title 10 forces and commanders should be encouraged to comply with national guidance. The concern
over a forward-leaning approach arises when Title 10
forces are not integrated into the response as expected
following deployment to the affected area. Federal
funds are used to transport units to the JOA. Upon
arrival, commanders often search for opportunities to
integrate their forces into the DSCA response to justify
the cost of transport, among other things. This external
pressure can have a detrimental effect and should be
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avoided to the extent possible. Therefore, DoD should
continue to preposition assets and personnel when
there is an anticipated need. However, despite public and Hollywood mythology, federal military forces
are not the nation’s principal emergency response
service. Therefore, upon arrival, commanders should
refrain from asking for Title 10 integration and instead
wait until they are requested through the established
methods.
Delineate Clear Federal Chain of Command Prior to
Deploying Forces.
To avoid similar confusion regarding the chain of
command structure in place for Sandy, once the decision is made to activate a dual status commander for
a joint DSCA response, both DoD and the affected
state(s) should clearly articulate and approve a unified chain of command. The roles, responsibilities,
and lines of command and coordination, respectively,
must be clearly established prior to the deployment of
a joint task force. During Sandy, there was confusion
over the role of the joint coordinating element (JCE)
and whether the JCE was internal or external to the
federal chain of command. As previously addressed,
some commanders who participated in the Sandy response contend that the JCE was the parent command
element to the DSC and therefore served as the command link between the DSC and the joint force land
component commander (JFLCC)-Army North (ARNORTH). Conversely, others claim the JCE was simply
a coordination element with no command authority
over the DSC. In this view, the DSC reported directly
to the JFLCC on the federal side. This confusion and
lack of clarity among participants during Sandy cre-
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ated additional challenges that should be avoided in
future DSCA operations. As early as possible, U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) should clearly
articulate a federal chain of command, including the
names and titles of each command echelon down to
the DSCs. Command and control wire charts should
be created and disseminated prior to operations, to
the greatest extent possible given the circumstances.
Eliminate the Joint Coordinating Element.
According to senior DoD officials, the inclusion of
a JCE during the Sandy response was a trial concept
intended to improve coordination efforts between
multiple dual status commanders and the federal
chain of command during a multistate incident.2 Due
to the increased confusion presented by the inclusion
of a JCE during Sandy, this command element should
be removed from future consideration. Some advocate
for inclusion of a JCE during a DSCA response to facilitate Title 10 force coordination, including joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). For a multistate event such as Sandy, effectively
coordinating Title 10 force activities logically warrants
consideration of a JCE. The problem occurs when the
JCE commander’s role is not clearly articulated. If using a JCE for the purpose of effective JRSOI of Title 10
forces, the JCE should not be included as part of the
formal command structure. Instead, the JCE should be
listed as a coordination entity (dotted line doctrinally)
only. If a JCE is not desired for JRSOI, then removing
the JCE entirely from the federal chain of command
reduces the layering effect noted during the Sandy response. Without a JCE, the dual status commander can
and should report directly to the JFLCC/ARNORTH
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commander as the parent command entity. Figure 5-1
illustrates how this command structure would have
looked during Hurricane Sandy.
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Figure 5-1. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure,
No JCE.
Appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer in Charge.
National response plans, such as the National Response Framework (NRF) and other guiding documents, call for one DCO to serve as the single point of
contact at the joint field office (JFO) for DoD activities
within each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions. However, as noted in Joint
Publication (JP) 3-28, larger incidents and multistate
incidents sometimes require additional DCOs to assist
in coordination efforts.3 According to DoD after-action
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reports and interviews, multiple DCOs deployed to
New York during Sandy, each with a defined area of
responsibility but no guidance for DCO-DCO coordination.4 Similar to the JCE, deploying multiple DCOs
creates the potential for confusion and coordination
issues. There were several issues noted in Sandy
after-action reports detailing failures of DCO-DCO
coordination within New York, resulting in duplicated planning efforts or redundant mission assignment generation—something that the DSC concept is
designed to help alleviate.
Currently, there is no defined adjudication process between the multiple DCOs assigned to a FEMA
region and NORTHCOM. In essence, NORTHCOM
may receive duplicate requests from different DCOs
in the same region who have no established protocol
to coordinate with each other. The suggested defense
coordinating officer in charge (DCOIC) billet will
serve as this needed adjudication body for all DCO
activity during designated incidents involving multiple DCOs. In this model, DCOs will preliminarily
approve requests for forces and submit them to the
DCOIC for final approval. The DCOIC will validate or
deny these requests and inform the DSC accordingly.
There are multiple options for designating a
DCOIC. One alternative is to simply designate a DCO
as the senior DCO in charge based on established criteria (rank seniority, time in billet, etc.). In this model,
all subordinate DCO activities are routed through
the DCOIC to ensure effective coordination, reduced
redundancy, and a unified mission assignment process. The DCOIC would coordinate directly with the
DSC JTF as the DoD representative to the JFO. An additional alternative to this recommendation places a
general officer in the DCOIC billet. In this model, the
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Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) commanding general (CG) is an ideal candidate for the DCOIC
position, as this person is one of the leading subject
matter experts on domestic civil support and DSCA.
Assuming a temporary assignment like DCOIC does
not conflict with the JTF-CS CG’s principal chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear DSCA responsibilities, this general officer should hold a key role in
the execution of DSCA operations, especially those using the DSC arrangement. This recommendation also
complements the previous suggestion to remove the
JCE from the command structure. Rather than assigning the JTF-CS CG to serve in a billet of questionable
necessity (JCE), this general officer can be deployed
to the designated JFO to serve as the DCOIC with ultimate approval authority over all DCO-authorized
mission assignments in the DSC JOA.
Regardless of the chosen option, establishing an
adjudication body for the multiple DCO constructs
likely to occur again in major incidents will help limit
future confusion and redundancies.
Define Time for Early Title 10 Integration.
Hurricane Sandy gave federal military forces the
opportunity to highlight their timely response capabilities. As members of a professional military force,
Active Duty Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines
remain in a constant state of readiness to deploy and
respond to domestic contingency operations. This
quick response capability was displayed during Sandy as various Title 10 assets converged on the JOA
within days of the storm’s landfall. The Active Component’s ability to mobilize and deploy forces quickly,
coupled with the Reserve component’s widespread
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geographic distribution of forces, often means Title
10 forces are able to respond quicker and with more
capabilities than their National Guard counterparts.
However, Title 10 forces come with a greater financial
requirement. Therefore, through state National Guard
capabilities and EMAC agreements, National Guard
assets are the primary military sourcing solution for
disaster response operations. Whether due to administrative delays through EMAC requests or insufficient capabilities, the National Guard cannot always
address immediate requirements, such as the need for
dewatering the New York City subway system during
Sandy. In these cases, states look to the Federal Government for support. With this in mind, DoD and the
governors should consider a strategic shift that would
allow federal forces to be sourced, following a request
from civil authorities and external to Immediate Response Authority (IRA), for a predetermined (and finite) period of time during the early phases of a DSCA
response. This can be done prior to sourcing National
Guard units during the initial stages of DSCA operations to facilitate quicker military response when
necessary.
The proposed Title 10 integration period should not
be misconstrued as an unrestricted authorization for
the DSC to employ Title 10 forces. Rather, this should
be considered a defined period of time when Title 10
forces can be sourced prior to the National Guard’s
arrival and without an approved mission assignment.
In many ways, this is similar to IRA in that the proposal allows federal forces to provide assistance without the need for paperwork delays. However, this is
different from IRA in that the DSC approves the Title
10 integration and therefore assumes tactical control
of the federal force. The DSC does not have tactical
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control of Title 10 forces operating under IRA, per JP
3-28.5 Similar to the policy governing IRA, this Title
10 integration period should extend at least 72 hours
from the activation of the DSC. During this period
and assuming consent of the federal and state commands respectively, the DSC should be authorized to
use Title 10 forces to address priority requests for assistance with consideration of cost share and mission
assignment generation after the fact.6 The integration
period should also establish a clear time limit (e.g.,
96 hours) to conclude all initial Title 10 sourcing. At
the conclusion of the proposed integration period, the
DSC can prioritize National Guard forces for secondary and tertiary requests. This will facilitate flexibility
and adaptation to the evolving situation and limit the
bureaucratic delays present in the current system.
The proposed Title 10 integration period will provide a mechanism to address external pressures to involve Title 10 forces in DSCA operations. Ideally, Title
10 forces would exercise better fidelity to the “last in,
first out” philosophy during domestic response. However, the political realities of domestic response often
supplant policy and law. The President, governor, and
other elected representatives risk a political death sentence for inadequate, insufficient, or late response in
events of national prominence or significance. As evidenced by the federal response to Hurricane Sandy,
politicians will often marginalize or abandon restrictive laws and policies in order to provide immediate
federal assistance and avoid public ridicule. Providing a mechanism to integrate Title 10 forces into the
early stages of a DSCA operation will address these
concerns while ensuring prompt assistance to civil
authorities when requested. It will further reduce the
tensions over Title 10 activities under IRA, as federal
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forces will be integrated into the response and under
the tactical control of the DSC.
Simply put, if DoD and the states are going to embrace the DSC concept, per the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act, as the usual and customary command arrangement during the simultaneous employment of the National Guard and Armed Forces, we
must empower the DSC in such a way that leverages
all available resources and capabilities, both state and
federal. The DSC should be able to request Title 10
forces to meet a need within the JOA so long as such
support is not illegal, immoral, or unethical. There are
too many impediments in the current process restricting commanders from providing the best and most
capable response resources in a timely manner, while
also encouraging the abuse of less restrictive policies
like IRA to justify response activities. This mechanism
will help address some of the noted issues.
Authorize Transition of Authority.
While the previously discussed recommendation
addresses initial Title 10 activities requested by the
DSC, it does not address similar activities performed
outside of the DSC’s knowledge under IRA. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3025.18 provides commanders IRA
when requested by a civil authority and under “imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from a higher authority.”7 In these instances and where Title 10 forces are operating within
the DSC’s joint operations area, consideration should
be given to whether the DSC should assume tactical
control of federal forces operating under IRA. This
topic is debated regularly in and around DoD, with
perspectives advocating both for and against such a
recommendation.
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Those who support the DSC gaining tactical control of Title 10 forces under IRA cite joint doctrinal
concepts, such as unified action and unity of effort8
as a basis for their argument, often noting that when
Title 10 forces operate under IRA and thus outside of
the DSC JTF, neither is achieved. Instead, their argument holds that any force operating outside of the
command of the DSC JTF creates friction rather than
promoting synergy and unity of effort. Advocates further contend that one of the main intentions for creating a DSC architecture is to unify state and federal
military actions under a single commander, albeit in a
mutually exclusive capacity. Title 10 forces operating
externally to this joint command structure are not in
consonance with the unified, coordinated concept the
DSC is designed to facilitate.
The counterargument to this position is rooted
in the tenets of federalism and the division of powers between the States and Federal Government. As
noted earlier, the legal framework guiding the use
of military forces domestically is complex. Despite
the complexities, however, critics affirm the constitutional basis of the laws and philosophical principles as
the foundational structure for using the military domestically. According to the Constitution—and with
support from Title 10 of the United States Code—the
President is the commander in chief of the Armed
Forces under all circumstances. When responding under IRA, Title 10 forces maintain autonomy from the
DSC, instead reporting directly to their service commanders and, in effect, to the President. Permitting a
DSC (who in most cases is a National Guard officer) to
assume tactical control of a Title 10 force under IRA,
according to critics, contradicts not only the doctrinal
restrictions prohibiting DSCs from exerting command
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authority over Title 10 forces under IRA,9 but also the
principles of federalism that are intended to ensure a
divided system of power and authority between the
states and national government. Using this logic, opponents even suggest that the mere concept of a DSC
violates the Constitution and the federalist system of
government.10
Regardless of perspective, DoD must determine a
policy and strategy for coordinating with or integrating Title 10 forces on IRA during a DSC-led DSCA
incident. While there is some question as to whether
the Marines were operating under IRA during their
initial arrival on Staten Island, the presence of a Title
10 force ashore during Sandy without the knowledge
of the DSC created avoidable tension and confusion.
In this case, the DSC in New York assumed tactical
control of the Marine detachment ashore on Staten
Island, following a series of discussions with other
general officers within the chain of command. This
tactical control ceased once the Marines returned to
the ship. Despite initial disagreements, the assumption of tactical control of the Marines worked under
these circumstances. Once the DSC gained situational
awareness of the Title 10 activities ashore, he was
better able to integrate their capabilities into future
missions and support activities. If this is determined
to be the most desirable course of action for future
incidents of similar circumstances, there should be a
process or procedure in place for the DSC to assume
tactical control of Title 10 forces under IRA without
having to go through several layers of command discussions. Defining such procedures in future doctrinal references will help future DSCs avoid the lengthy
command discussions and negotiations that occurred
during Sandy.
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Designate and Employ a Title 10 Adaptive
Task Force.
Much of the Title 10 activity during the Sandy response occurred under Task Force (TF) Pump, a joint
force represented by all four services and responsible
for numerous dewatering missions throughout the
JOA in New York. This model worked well during
Sandy. As a somewhat ad hoc and hastily requested
force asset, TF Pump gave the DSC the tactical flexibility to employ Title 10 forces for specific missions related to dewatering, pumping, etc. TF Pump received
most of the requests for dewatering and subsequent
mission assignments falling under this special capability. This provided the DSC with at least one clear
decision point during the entirety of the response
operation. Similar actions should be considered for
future missions.
Given the notable successes of TF Pump during
Sandy, DSCs, in consonance with their state and federal chains of command, should identify a large critical
mission capability (such as dewatering during Sandy)
during the initial stages of a response effort. After
agreeing on this capability requirement, NORTHCOM should identify and designate a unit capable of
providing such services. This unit should be issued
prepare-to-deploy orders and assume the designation
as the Title 10 adaptive task force. Once identified, the
DSC can exercise the option to activate the adaptive
task force to complete mission assignments within
the task force’s identified specialty. Predetermining
a Title 10 task force for performing specific mission
functions will limit the tensions between Title 10 and
Title 32 commanders lobbying for inclusion of their
respective assets.
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As with the other recommendations, there are
counterarguments to this as well. It is difficult to predict future incident requirements, so employing an
adaptive task force may not always be a possibility.
Beyond this, there is a cost element associated with
a federal military force supporting civil authorities.
Financial considerations are (or should be) external
to the DSC’s focus during a DSCA response. However, cost is something that must be considered when
determining whether to deploy any Title 10 force in
support of civil authorities. With this in mind, some
might suggest that a Title 10 task force represents unnecessary redundancy that can otherwise be sourced
from existing unit capabilities. While these are valid
considerations, designating an adaptive Title 10 task
force is still worth considering, based on the observations from TF Pump during Hurricane Sandy.
Maximize the Use, Distribution, and Presence
of Liaison Officers.
You can’t have enough LNOs in my opinion.11
		

National Guard Interview

One of the most frequently discussed topics following the Sandy response was the use of liaison officers (LNOs) throughout the operation. Numerous
interviews and after-action reports noted the importance of using LNOs to coordinate efforts and enhance
situational awareness across the seemingly endless
bureaucracy of local, state, and federal agencies, departments, offices, and services participating in the
response. The mostly positive feedback concerning
LNOs suggests that these positions are vital to suc-
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cessful coordination and information sharing of future DSCA response efforts, especially under the DSC
construct when both states and the Federal Government are represented.
LNOs provided critical information to commanders and their staffs during the entire Sandy response
effort. While they were used in many places, some
agencies or offices did not have LNOs representing
all relevant military units. In addition to providing a
Title 10 and Title 32 LNO to every major command
element, including both the DSC and any adaptive
Title 10 task force, LNOs should also be located in the
State Office of Emergency Management or Emergency
Operations Center, and with FEMA to facilitate mission assignment coordination and subsequent force
packaging. Additionally, some LNOs were underutilized according to various reports. Given the critical
capability and knowledge provided by LNOs, assigning liaison personnel to perform staff functions is not
an effective way to leverage their presence as subject
matter experts in coordination. DoD and the National
Guard should continue using LNOs in every location
deemed necessary and ensure they are used in a manner consistent with their capability and expertise.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The most needed recommendation is to establish a
DSC policy. Short of that, there are several policy revisions worth considering to improve future DSCA efforts involving the DSC arrangement. The most pressing change, based on observations from Hurricane
Sandy, centers on the IRA provision in DoDD 3025.18.
Additionally, revisions need to be made to the mission assignment process and certain Title 10 and Title
32 legislation, among other things.
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Immediate Response Authority.
Revise and Codify Definition of Civil Authority.
The current language describing IRA in DoDD
3025.18, 4(g) states:
In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if
time does not permit approval from higher authority,
DoD officials may provide an immediate response by
temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided
by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human
suffering, or mitigate great property damage within
the United States.12

The policy language here, according to DoD officials, is intentionally vague to allow for flexibility in
the interpretation of what constitutes a civil authority.13 The intended ambiguity allows for open interpretation based on individual circumstances and provides
justification for military commanders to offer critical
support to civil authorities without the need to subject
their decisions to a lengthy and often-cumbersome approval process. This ensures that when American citizens have an immediate need for military support, the
language of a policy does not prevent saving lives and
alleviating suffering. Conceptually, this is sound logic
based on the best interests of the American people. In
practice, however, there are issues with the current
wording that can lead to abuse of the provision or arguments over whether federal military action actually
constitutes IRA.
Among the many ambiguities, the IRA policy fails
to define an appropriate level of civil authority to re-
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quest assistance from DoD using the IRA justification.
As noted earlier, U.S. Marines from the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) came ashore on Staten
Island at the request of an unidentified employee of
the New York/New Jersey Port Authority.14 While
these actions have not been formally designated as
IRA, as some question whether “imminently serious
conditions” were present, there is no other legal basis
for justifying the Marines’ presence on Staten Island
during the initial response period. Based on previous
language, “the Marine invasion of Staten Island,” as it
has been referred to, was, in effect, compliant with at
least part of Section 4(g) of DoDD 3025.18, in response
to a request for assistance from a civil authority. Aside
from revisiting the semantics and meaning of “under
imminently serious conditions,” DoD should consider
revising, expanding, and clarifying the description of
“civil authority” as it applies to IRA.
In its current form, the term “civil authority” is ambiguous and leaves significant room for interpretation.
According to JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, civil authorities are:
Those elected and appointed officers and employees
who constitute the government of the United States,
the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United
States territories, and political subdivisions thereof.15

This broad definition lacks the specificity needed
for DSCA operations and, legally speaking, facilitates
federal military actions in response to a request from
any level of civil authority without restriction. Others
can debate the necessity of the Marines’ presence on
Staten Island and whether “imminently serious conditions” existed. The emphasis here is that DoD should
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consider revising the term civil authority(ies) to avoid
future confusion and/or abuse of the IRA policy. The
revision should specify distinct levels of civil authorities on a hierarchical scale; or, where appropriate,
titles of positions. It should further designate what
level constitutes an appropriate requesting authority (e.g., “In response to a request from a Level 3 civil
authority . . .”). Such policy revisions are needed to
avoid similar problems in future response efforts. In
addition to expanding on the appropriate level of civil
authority to which the DoD can respond under IRA,
the provision should be revised to expand and clarify
“supplemental direction.”
Supplemental Direction.
The IRA guidance permits military commanders to engage in immediate response “subject to any
supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters.”16 In order to avoid abuse of IRA in future DSCled DSCA efforts, DoD should create a standardized
“supplemental direction” for reference under IRA. In
this context, DoD and/or NORTHCOM should consider drafting a template standing order or directive to
augment or serve in addition to the current Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff DSCA Standing Execution
Order. This additional standing order shall be applicable specifically to DSC-led responses and instances
of IRA under which federal forces may operate. This
order should be issued by the NORTHCOM CG and
hold all Title 10 force commanders accountable to a
specified standard of conduct or procedure when providing assistance under IRA.
For example: U.S. Marines of all ranks are intimately familiar with the 11 general orders of a sentry. Just
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as a marine can receive punitive action for quitting
his/her post without being properly relieved (general
order 5), a military commander should be deterred
from abusing or violating federal policy on DSCA.
Similar in style and custom to the general orders of a
sentry, NORTHCOM should develop a standing general order to guide the conduct of DSCA operations
under IRA, with emphasis on those occurring within
the DSC construct.
Example General Order for Immediate Response
Authority within a DSC JOA: Commanders using Immediate Response Authority to support civil authorities within a dual status commander joint operations
area must notify the dual status commander within
three hours of authorizing immediate response.
Currently, there is no incentive for commanders
to ensure the integrity of DSCA doctrine, policies,
and procedures. While the legal basis for some Title
10 actions during Sandy is questionable, it is nearly
inconceivable to think of a situation where such violations of policy or law would result in punitive action against the responsible commander, nor are we
suggesting that commanders should be punished for
providing immediate response, especially when the
actions of response forces are carried out with the intent to provide assistance to local residents. However,
without changes or additions to the current policy,
there is ongoing potential for similar issues in future
DSCA activities. Issuing a combatant command endorsed general order prior to the execution of a DSCA
response would provide the necessary mechanism
or incentive for command compliance with standing
laws, policies, and procedures. The revision to the
IRA guidance could read: DoD officials may provide
an immediate response by temporarily employing
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the resources under their control, in accordance with
NORTHCOM general order or any additional supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters.
As with other recommendations, this suggestion may be unpopular with some. While the need to
maintain speed and flexibility during DSCA is critical, maintaining accountability and awareness of response activities is important as well. In many cases,
creating additional layers of policy compliance slows
response decisionmaking and operational efficiency.
In this case, however, requiring a single notification
from a Title 10 commander to the DSC does not add to
existing restrictions, nor does it limit a commander’s
ability to provide support under IRA. This recommendation simply ensures Title 10 commanders exercising
IRA provide the DSC with appropriate notification of
their intent and ongoing activities up to the 72-hour
period of authorization. This contributes to the goal of
achieving unified actions and an overall unity of effort
under a DSC-led JTF.
Mission Assignment Process.
The recommendations given earlier offer a mechanism for clarifying preliminary considerations and approval measures for Title 10 actions under the pretext
of IRA. However, the DSC in New York encountered
several issues after Title 10 forces arrived, most of
which can be improved through changes to current
mission assignment policies.
Assuming Title 10 actions meet all established criteria for IRA, the DSC may wish to sustain this support activity beyond the currently approved 72-hour
authorization period. To facilitate sustained Title 10
activity beyond the first 72 hours of IRA, a mission
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assignment must be generated and approved through
the appropriate channels, or Title 10 forces risk being subjected to a work stoppage request, as was the
case with the Marines on Staten Island. To avoid such
problems, DoD, in conjunction with the requesting local/state agency, should codify a process by which a
mission assignment/formal request for assistance is
generated and submitted through the proper channels. Developing a post-IRA mission assignment/request for assistance process and incorporating it into
current policies will:
•	Fill a current gap in which no policy guidance
exists for actions occurring beyond the initial
72-hour period under IRA.
•	Provide a policy/doctrinal basis for DSCs to
assume tactical control of Title 10 forces operating within the JOA, if desired.
•	Provide a needed policy mechanism for reimbursement of Title 10 support activities that
will eventually fall under an approved mission
assignment.
Without the restrictions, civil authorities with
knowledge of the IRA policy language can ignore the
current mission assignment and/or request for assistance process while leveraging the ambiguous language of IRA. As seen during Sandy, this can lead to
violations, intentional or not, of policy and, in some
cases, law. The absence of this essential guidance
further marginalizes the essential considerations for
initiating requests for DoD support, often leading to
greater end costs and confusion.
With this in mind, DoD should consider developing a draft instruction outlining the specifics of the
mission assignment process, to include when and
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how Title 10 forces operate under IRA.17 The political pressures and realities of a response situation can
cause the established system of accountability to be
circumvented, or in some cases abandoned. Sending
troops “towards the sounds of chaos”18 may be politically convenient for elected officials seeking public
approval and for military commanders cleverly seeking a boost in their service’s recruiting mission and
budget appropriations, but it can also impede and
aggravate planned and coordinated response efforts.
Final Thoughts.
Again, in most cases, we would not advocate for
expanding an already burdensome series of laws,
policies, and procedures. The singular intent of IRA
is to provide a policy justification for rapid military
support under imminently serious conditions when
time does not permit commanders to obtain senior
leader approval. Adding layers to and expanding the
language of a policy intended to ensure speed and
flexibility under dire circumstances seems counterintuitive. However, the single most debated activity
during the entire joint response to Hurricane Sandy
occurred under the questionable justification of IRA,
hence the motivation to suggest changes.
Many with direct knowledge and experience of the
response in New York refute the justification offered
by commanders that the Marines came ashore under
IRA, noting that their arrival occurred 6 days after the
storm’s initial landfall and without urgent need or
“imminently serious conditions.”19 Moreover, according to the same sources, the initial Marine activities on
Staten Island did not “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”20 Therefore, according to many, these actions do not consti100

tute IRA. Others dispute this argument and reaffirm
the Marines’ support to the residents of Staten Island
was justified under IRA, as they were requested to
come ashore by a civil authority and in response to an
immediate need as determined by the authorities on
the ground.
One position remains consistent among those
we spoke with, however. Regardless of the circumstances leading to or the justification for the Marines’
support in New York, the activities carried out by
the Marines post-Sandy were extremely beneficial to
the residents and local authorities. So, while nobody
debates the positive impact the Marines had on the
Sandy response, the argument over IRA has been and
will continue to be debated. Regardless of position,
this debate centers on the subjective and often widely
varied interpretation of the IRA policy in its current
form. Our recommendations for changing the IRA
policy address the primary concerns voiced by the
majority of our data sources. At the very least, DoD
should consider the preceding suggestions and form
their own assessments by evaluating the utility and
applicability of the content as it would be applied to a
future DSC-led DSCA response.
Legislative and Associated Policy Revisions.
10 U.S.C. § 12304a.
Section 515 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act added the legal authority for the
Secretary of Defense to activate Reserve forces of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in response
to a governor’s request for federal assistance during
a disaster or emergency.21 On December 31, 2011, 10
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U.S.C. § 12304a became law and was implemented for
the first time during the DoD response to Hurricane
Sandy in New York with the activation of the three
separate Army Reserve quartermaster detachments.22
As with the larger DSC structure, the first attempt
to implement this newly adopted statute resulted in
some notable issues.
Sandy reports suggest that, although approved
mission assignments were generated for the Army
Reserve units in New York, coordinating with these
detachments proved challenging. While the details of
these challenges are vague at best, the recurrence of
the issue across multiple sources suggests that DoD
needs to improve Reserve component activation policies, and procedures under 10 U.S.C. § 12304a, in consonance with the recommendations noted in the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s 2012 Information Memo
on Reserve Component Operations in the Homeland.23
Since the Reserve component is now a force-sourcing
solution for DoD during disasters and emergencies,
federal response capabilities and capacities are even
greater. To maximize the effective use of the Reserve
component during such incidents, each service branch
must also implement policies detailing the activation
procedures for their respective Reserve units under
12304a, including circumstances when Reserve units
will be activated and under what capacity.
Establishing defined policies and procedures for
reserve unit activation and sourcing under 12304a will
improve an appointed DSC’s ability to manage a joint
operation. Due to its widespread geographic distribution throughout the continental United States, the
Reserve component is a significant force multiplying
asset that should be integrated into emergency and
disaster response when required. This newly adopted
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legislation needs to be followed by service-specific
policies that will ensure efficient mobilization and deployment of Reserve units in future DSC-led DSCA
operations. Just as the Reserve component can now be
a viable sourcing solution for Title 10 response efforts,
so, too, can the National Guard.
32 U.S.C. § 502f.
Under 32 U.S.C. § 502f, the National Guard (or a
member thereof) may “be ordered to perform training
or other duty . . . (2) that may include . . . (A) support
of operations or missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary
of Defense.”24 When using 502f to activate the National Guard, troops remain under State control while
support operations are funded 100 percent by DoD.
Because states often are unable to fund their National
Guard forces fully under State Active Duty for more
than a few days, 502f provides a legal mechanism to
relieve states of a funding dilemma. Historically, this
legislation has been used as federal authority to mobilize the National Guard during nationally significant
disaster responses such as Hurricane Katrina, as well
as pre-planned national special security events.25 As
this statute offers states a mechanism to maintain control of the National Guard at 100 percent cost share to
the Federal Government, it is clearly advantageous for
states to request approval of a 502f designation during a presidentially declared disaster. However, due
to ambiguity in the law, combined with states’ desires
for maximum control at minimum cost, states regularly request 502f designation from DoD. While some
requests are approved, many are subsequently denied. Revising the current 502f language is necessary
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to address some of these issues, especially as it applies
to force sourcing decisions within the DSC construct.
The main objective of the DSC during a no-notice/
limited-notice incident like Sandy is to promote unity
of effort between the National Guard and the Armed
Forces. As such, the DSC should not be strategically
or even operationally focused. The DSC should be a
resource employer: a tactically focused commander
looking to send the right resources to the right place
at the right time. This general officer serves as a coordination mechanism between states and the Federal
Government, and should not be concerned with the
legal nuances and interpretations limiting National
Guard duty statuses and funding source determinations. The DSC should possess a working knowledge
of such information so as to appropriately influence
tactical decisionmaking. However, National Guard
duty status should be externally adjudicated to the
DSC purview. If the DSC can use the National Guard
to fill a request for assistance intended for Title 10
forces, he or she should not be limited in employing
the necessary or available resources simply due to
statutory nuances. Changing the current 502f wording to include specific criteria or guidelines for 502f
designation and subsequent sourcing solutions can
add strategic, operational, and tactical value to future
DSCA operations.
Thus, DoD, the National Guard Bureau, and the
states should establish specific criteria for 502f designation that includes the type(s) of incident(s) and/or
circumstance(s) leading to a 502f authorization and
under what circumstances a DSC can use 32 U.S.C. §
502f forces as a sourcing solution in place of Title 10
forces. Building on the recommendations of the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s 2012 Information Memo
noted e arlier, these revisions should include criteria
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such as complex catastrophes, national significance or
impact, or multistate response.26 Defining such criteria
and force-sourcing procedures will minimize the time
required to allocate Title 32 resources if requested by
the DSC. The 502f revisions, coupled with 12304a revisions, will address two notable gaps in the DSCA
response to Sandy. While the DSC does not need to
be an expert on the legal discussion, ignorance to the
relevant laws is intolerable. As such, lawyers can and
should be included as part of the joint staff in future
DSC-led missions.
Inclusion of Staff Judge Advocate as part of
Joint Task Force Headquarters Staff.
If you tell military commanders to cut through the
red tape and make things happen, as was the case in
Sandy, it is often the lawyer, or staff judge advocate
(SJA), who is excised from the command decisionmaking process. With the numerous legal complexities and considerations that arise during a DSC-led
DSCA response, excluding the SJA and overlooking
laws and regulations leads to greater challenges during and after the incident. In some cases, the perceived
urgency of a no-notice/limited-notice response effort
and the need to provide assistance takes precedence
over necessary legal considerations for managing and
employing state and federal forces. Some decisions
made during the Sandy response were of questionable legality and contrasted with the interpretations
or advice of participating legal officers.27 In other instances, SJAs were not provided an opportunity to advise commanders prior to such decisions.28 As Sandy
was the first attempt at using the DSC arrangement in
this capacity, these issues are expected but should be
addressed for future operations.
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However cumbersome, nuanced, and seemingly
arbitrary these laws may seem to commanders focused on accomplishing a mission, laws are written to
provide structure and limits. Within the context of the
DSC, many of the relevant laws are rooted in the Constitution and the foundational principles by which we
govern our Armed Forces. Lawyers arguably provide
some of the most critical knowledge during a combined state and federal military response; they cannot
be excluded from advising the DSC on the statutory
limitations of military actions under unpredictable
circumstances.
As part of its effort to develop a DSC instruction
for DSCA operations, DoD should incorporate policy
guidance that encourages the use and active employment of DSCA-knowledgeable SJA personnel as contributing members of future JTF staffs. Consideration
should also be given to employing two attorneys: one
with Title 10 knowledge and oversight and one with
Title 32 knowledge and oversight. Including SJAs in
future DSCA staffs will enhance the operational and
legal integrity and minimize future issues like those
encountered following Sandy. However, legal knowledge alone is not sufficient to improving future DSCA
operations under the DSC construct. The confusion
among Title 10 forces during this response points to
a critical need to improve DSCA education in future
Title 10 officers.
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Expand and Reinforce DSCA Education
for Officers.
If Sandy is a barometer for the state of DSCA
knowledge among Title 10 commanders, there is significant room for improvement. Not only were some
Title 10 commanders unaware of who the DSC was or
how to contact him and his staff, but also some officers
had never heard of the DSC construct prior to Hurricane Sandy.29 Active Component forces demonstrated
a degree of ignorance or disregard to the mission assignment process that was reaffirmed through command guidance. By abandoning processes and procedures, some Title 10 forces supplanted (rather than
supported) local authorities’ efforts. Likewise, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) personnel were
equally unfamiliar with the DSC construct and the
statutory limitations over Title 10 forces in support of
ESF 3. While not a blanket indictment of the military
officer corps or the USACE, as only a small sample
participated in Sandy, these issues are just some of the
many encountered during the DSCA response, further
suggesting that improvements to DSCA education are
necessary.
Most, if not all, top-level DoD schools offer some
degree of DSCA education through practical application exercises, classroom instruction, or a combination
of both. Many officers also receive in-depth instruction on or exposure to the topic through the completion of these and other capstone-type projects pursued
while in residence. So, while most commanders have
received at least some exposure to DSCA, the inherent
complexities and fluidity of the DSCA environment require constant refresher training. Not all commands/
billets require the same level of DSCA knowledge,
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however. Therefore, DoD, with the support of the
individual services, should identify and designate
DSCA-relevant command billets required to complete
annual DSCA training. Following an assessment of expected DSCA requirements, capabilities assessments
should help identify DSCA-capable units and their
respective command billets. An example of a DSCAcapable unit is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
MEU commanders from I and II MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force, continental United States) should receive annual refresher training similar in format to the
currently offered DSCA courses via Joint Knowledge
Online.
In addition to identifying DSCA-relevant command billets and requiring refresher training, DSCA
education should occur during basic officer training
and continue during subsequent professional military
education and career level schools. Marine officers attending The Basic School, for example, should receive
DSCA familiarization training via classroom instruction during Phase IV of the course curriculum. Following initial exposure in entry level schools, officers
will have a foundational understanding of the subject
to leverage as they progress through future professional military education. Adopting such educational
requirements for company grade officers will ensure
those officers slated for top-level school and future
command billets at DSCA-capable units possess the
necessary and continued education to facilitate operationally and tactically sound decisionmaking in future
DSCA environments.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The U.S. military’s primary mission is to fight and
win our nation’s wars. In this regard, our nation’s military will continue training for combat operations and
other contingency missions around the world. However, with the ongoing defense drawdown from combat operations in Afghanistan, the military will now
look to enhance its civil support readiness as a priority domestic mission focus. The reality is that, when a
large-scale event occurs, the Department of Defense
(DoD) and its assets can provide timely and extensive
support beyond the capacity of any state or local government agency. Combining Title 10 and Title 32 forces only further multiplies this already unparalleled
capability. Written into law as the “usual and customary” arrangement during the simultaneous employment of the National Guard and Armed Forces,1 the
dual status commander (DSC) arrangement serves as
the coordination mechanism that should enable the
efficient and effective integration and employment of
military forces to meet the needs of those affected by
future disasters and emergencies. With the events of
Hurricane Sandy behind us, now is the time to learn
from this historic response and determine ways to improve future military civil support efforts under the
DSC construct.
The preceding analysis offered suggestions aimed
at improving the mechanics of the DSC process through
various operational strategy and policy-oriented recommendations. The DSC concept shows promise and
has been used again in more recent events with notable success.2 While the concept is sound, the execution
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during Sandy was flawed. Failing to acknowledge
and improve upon the lessons learned from Sandy
will question the efficacy of using DSCs for future response efforts. If we truly want to commit to the DSC
as the usual and customary command arrangement as
the law states, we need to maximize the use of this and
other analyses to repeat the successes and avoid the
failures in future operations.
With such a large and complex mission to coordinate, including the consideration of relevant laws,
procedures, and command authorities, many of which
are embedded in our Constitution, the DSC construct
provides the necessary structure to facilitate effective
Defense Support of Civilian Authorities operations
between States and the Federal Government. While
improvisation, adaptability, and flexibility are valued
aspects of military operational doctrine and missionoriented command and control, the complexities of
no-notice/limited-notice response missions require
some semblance of organization and boundaries.
Hurricane Sandy was a significant event; but it
was not a catastrophe. The urgency of the federal
response and the lack of adherence to policies and
procedures added to the confusion in some cases. We
cannot forecast future requirements, nor can we predict how future operations will transpire. There will
always be a level of uncertainty and a sense of urgency during no-notice/limited-notice incidents. We
can, however, mitigate, in part, future uncertainty and
confusion through the application of lessons learned,
such as those provided in this analysis. By identifying
and incorporating lessons learned into future incident
response, we can continue our efforts to mature these
complex operations. Such improvements will likely
lead to increased capability of military personnel; en-
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hanced knowledge for those unfamiliar with the identified concepts; and ultimately, more lives, property,
and resources saved in the aftermath of the next event
requiring defense support of civil authorities.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
Public Law 112-81, H.R. 1540, p. 98.
2. A DSC was appointed and commanded Joint Task Force
Centennial, a combined Title 10 and 32 operation, during the September 2013 response to the Colorado Floods.
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APPENDIX I
ACRONYMS
AAR

After Action Report

AC

Active Component

ADP

Army Doctrinal Publication

ARG

Amphibious Ready Group

ARNORTH

Army North

BG

Brigadier General

CBRN	Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear
CG

Commanding General

CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
CJCSG	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Guidance
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual
COCOM

Combatant Command

CONUS

Continental United States

COP

Common Operating Picture

DCO

Defense Coordinating Officer

DLA

Defense Logistics Agency

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD

Department of Defense Directive

DSCA	Defense Support of Civil
Authorities
DSC

Dual Status Commander
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DSC JTF	Dual Status Commander Joint
Task Force
EMAC	Emergency Management
Assistance Compact
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officer
ESF

Emergency Support Function

EXORD

Execution Order

FCO

Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management
Agency
FM

Field Manual

FRAGO

Fragmentary Order

GAO	Government Accountability
Office
GOV

Governor

HD

Homeland Defense

HD/ASA	Homeland Defense and
America’s Security Affairs
HQMC

Headquarters Marine Corps

HS

Homeland Security

IRA

Immediate Response Authority

JBMDL	Joint Base McGuire Dix
Lakehurst
JCE

Joint Coordinating Element

JFHQ

Joint Force Headquarters

JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component
Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander
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JKO

Joint Knowledge Online

JOA

Joint Operations Area

JP

Joint Publication

JRSOI	Joint Reception Staging Onward
Movement and Integration
JTF

Joint Task Force

JTF-CS

Joint Task Force Civil Support

LNO

Liaison Officer

LTG

Lieutenant General

MA

Mission Assignment

MA

Massachusetts

MD

Maryland

MEF

Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU

Marine Expeditionary Unit

MG

Major General

MOA

Memorandum of Agreement

MTTP	Multi-Service Tactics Techniques
and Procedures
NDAA
Act

National Defense Authorization

NG

National Guard

NGB

National Guard Bureau

NH

New Hampshire

NIMS	National Incident Management
System
NJ

New Jersey

NRF

National Response Framework

NSSE

National Security Special Event
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NORTHCOM

U.S. Northern Command

NY

New York

NYC

New York City

OEM	Office of Emergency
Management
OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA

Pennsylvania

PCA

Posse Comitatus Act

PL

Public Law

PME

Professional Military Education

POTUS

President of the United States

PTDO

Prepare to Deploy Orders

RFA

Request for Assistance

RI

Rhode Island

SAD

State Active Duty

SCO

State Coordinating Officer

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

SJA

Staff Judge Advocate

T10

Title 10

T32

Title 32

TACON

Tactical Control

TAG

The Adjutants General

TF

Task Force

TRANSCOM	United States Transportation
Command
TS

Tropical Storm

UOC

Unity of Command

UOE

Unity of Effort
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US

United States

USA

United States Army

USACE	United States Army Corps of
Engineers
USAF

United States Air Force

USAR

United States Army Reserve

USC

United States Code

USCG

United States Coast Guard

USFF

United States Fleet Forces

USMC

United States Marine Corps

USN

United States Navy

USS

United States Ship

VOCO	Verbal Orders of the
Commanding Officer
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APPENDIX II
DUAL STATUS COMMANDER
DESIGNATION PROCESS

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-28, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2013, p. C-9.

Figure II-1. DSC Designation Process.
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